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Abstract
We present a security model for authenticated key establishment that allows for quan-
tum interactions between the adversary and quantum oracles that emulate classical parties,
resulting in a truly post-quantum security definition. We then give a generic construction
for a secure protocol in the quantum random oracle model by combining a signature scheme
which is existentially unforgeable under adaptive quantum chosen message attack in the
quantum random oracle model (EUF-qCMA-QRO secure) with an unauthenticated key es-
tablishment protocol which is secure against a passive adversary. This construction allows
us to give an explicit example of a secure protocol whose security is based on a variant
of the Diffie-Hellman problem for isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves; in particular,
generic security-strengthening transformations allow us to take a signature scheme which is
EUF-CMA-RO secure against a quantum adversary and transform it into an EUF-qCMA-
QRO signature scheme, which we combine with a standard secure unauthenticated key
establishment protocol to achieve the desired result.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the primary objectives of cryptography is to enable secure communications over
public channels. Frequently this goal is achieved by establishing a shared secret among
communicating parties to be used for an encryption scheme; the process of establishing
such a shared secret is called key establishment. Of course, key establishment is not useful
if the communicating parties cannot be convinced that they are establishing keys with the
intended peers (rather than with a malicious third party who is hijacking the communi-
cations), and so for that reason so-called authenticated key establishment protocols have
been developed.
In order to talk about the efficacy of a protocol we need a suitable notion of “security;”
this is a delicate subject, as the specifications of party and attacker capabilities that lead to
the security definition (called the security model) must accurately reflect the security prop-
erties to be modelled. In light of the development of quantum computers, cryptographers
are becoming more and more interested in modelling post-quantum cryptography—classical
cryptographic protocols which are secure even against a quantum attacker1. Though post-
quantum security models have been proposed for encryption [12, 34] and signature schemes
[5], no adequate model has yet been proposed for authenticated key establishment. In this
work we propose such a security model.
1What exactly is meant by a “quantum attacker” depends on the specific security model. At the least,
a quantum attacker will have access to a quantum computer.
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The motivating idea of the security model presented here is that a post-quantum secu-
rity model must allow for quantum interactions between legitimate communicating parties
and an attacker; this leads naturally to the security model we present in Chapter 4. Once
the model is defined we give a general method for constructing a secure authenticated key
establishment protocol and give a specific example of a secure protocol.
1.1 Thesis Outline
The material in this thesis is covered in the following order. In the remainder of Chap-
ter 1 we cover the mathematical background of algebraic geometry and elliptic curves in
particular, the fundamentals of quantum information processing, some notions regarding
functions, and examples of computational assumptions used in cryptography. In Chapter
2 we discuss some fundamental parts of public-key cryptography that will enable us to
construct secure authenticated key establishment protocols. Chapter 3 is a discussion of
what a security model for authenticated key establishment should entail, and a survey
of some important security models. In Chapter 4 we detail our new security model for
post-quantum authenticated key establishment, and give a generic construction for secure
protocols in this model; in Chapter 5 we apply this construction to obtain a concrete exam-
ple of a secure authenticated key establishment protocol. Finally, we conclude and discuss
future work in Chapter 6.
1.2 Mathematical Background – Algebraic Geometry
To understand the construction we will use for a secure authenticated key establishment
protocol, one must first understand the fundamentals of algebraic geometry. We very
briefly cover the required definitions here, extracting the relevant parts of [33, Chapter I];
for a more thorough reference see, for instance, [14].
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1.2.1 Affine Varieties
Definition 1.1 (Affine n-Space). For a fixed field K, affine n-space over K is the set
An = {(x1, . . . , xn) : x1, . . . , xn ∈ K}, where K is the algebraic closure of K.
For any field L ⊆ K the set of L-rational points of An is the set
An(L) = {(x1, . . . , xn) : x1, . . . , xn ∈ L} = An ∩ Ln.
We will be concerned with special subsets of An called algebraic sets.
Definition 1.2 (Affine Algebraic Set). For any ideal J ⊆ K[x1, x2, . . . , xn] we associate
the set V (J) ⊆ An defined by
V (J) = {P ∈ An : f(P ) = 0 for all f ∈ J}.
Any set U ⊆ An of the form U = V (J) for some ideal J ⊆ K[x1, x2, . . . , xn] is called an
affine algebraic set.
Just as we can construct affine algebraic sets in An from ideals in K[x1, x2, . . . , xn], we
can construct ideals from affine algebraic sets.
Definition 1.3 (Ideal of an Affine Algebraic Set). For any affine algebraic set U ⊆ An we
associate the ideal I(U) defined by
I(U) = {f ∈ K[x1, x2, . . . , xn] : f(P ) = 0 for all P ∈ U}.
We call an affine algebraic set U an affine variety if its ideal I(U) is prime.
For any field L ⊆ K, we say that an affine algebraic set U is defined over L if I(U)
is generated by a set of polynomials in L[x1, x2, . . . , xn]. In this case the set of L-rational
points of U is the set U(L) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ U : x1, . . . , xn ∈ L} = U ∩ An(L).
For any variety U ⊆ An, define its coordinate ring as K[U ] = K[x1, x2, . . . , xn]/I(U);
moreover, define its function field K(U) to be the field of fractions of K[U ]; i.e.,
K(U) ∼= (K[U ]×K[U ]\{0})/ ∼
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where ∼ is an equivalence relation defined by (f1, g1) ∼ (f2, g2) if and only if f1g2− f2g1 ∈
I(U). It is easy to see that K(U) is a finite-dimensional K-vector space; we define the
dimension of U—written dimU—to be the transcendence degree of K(U) over K; that is,
the size of the largest algebraically independent subset (over K) of K(U).
For the purposes of elliptic curve cryptography we require a type of variety which is
especially well-behaved.
Definition 1.4 (Non-Singular Point; Non-Singular Variety). Let U be a variety. By
Hilbert’s Basis Theorem [17, Section VIII.4, Theorem 4.9], I(U) is finitely-generated; say
I(U) = (f1, f2, . . . , ft) for some f1, f2, . . . , ft ∈ K[x1, x2, . . . , xn]. We say that P ∈ U is a
non-singular point of U if the Jacobian matrix
J(f1, . . . , ft) =
(
∂fi
∂xj
(P )
)
1≤i≤t
1≤j≤n
has rank n− dimU , where ∂fi
∂xj
(P ) is the formal partial derivative of fi with respect to xj
evaluated at P . We say that U is non-singular if each point of U is non-singular.
1.2.2 Projective Varieties
We now define a new space and type of variety derived from affine space and affine varieties.
Definition 1.5 (Projective n-space). Given a field K, projective n-space over K is defined
as
Pn = (An+1\{~0})/ ∼
where ∼ is the equivalence relation defined by (x0, x1, . . . , xn) ∼ (y0, y1, . . . , yn) if and only
if there is λ ∈ K\{0} such that xi = λyi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
We denote the elements of Pn as [x0, x1, . . . , xn], where (x0, x1, . . . , xn) is any coset
representative. The values x0, x1, . . . , xn are called the homogeneous coordinates of the
point.
As in the case of affine n-space, we can consider the set of L-rational points in projective
n-space, defined as Pn(L) = {[x0, x1, . . . , xn] : xi ∈ L for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n}. As well, we will
consider projective algebraic sets; we first require the notion of a homogeneous polynomial.
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Definition 1.6 (Homogeneous Polynomial). A polynomial f ∈ K[x0, x1, . . . , xn] is said to
be homogeneous if there exists d ∈ N so that
f(λP ) = λdf(P )
for all λ ∈ K and for all P ∈ Pn. The number d is the degree of homogeneity.
An ideal is said to be homogeneous if it is generated by homogeneous polynomials.
Projective algebraic sets are defined in terms of homogeneous ideals.
Definition 1.7 (Projective Algebraic Set). Let J ⊆ K[x0, x1, . . . , xn] be a homogeneous
ideal. To J we associate a subset V (J) of Pn defined by
V (J) = {[x0, x1, . . . , xn] ∈ Pn : f(x0, x1, . . . , xn) = 0 for all homogeneous f ∈ J}
A subset U of Pn is called a projective algebraic set if U = V (J) for some homogeneous
ideal J of K[x0, x1, . . . , xn].
Analogous to the case of affine algebraic sets, we associate to every projective algebraic
set U a homogeneous ideal I(U) defined by
I(U) =
({
f ∈ K[x0, x1, . . . , xn] : f is homogeneous and f(P ) = 0 for all P ∈ U
})
and we say that a projective algebraic set is defined over a field L ⊆ K if its ideal is
generated homogeneous by polynomials in L[x0, x1, . . . , xn]. If U is defined over L, we
define the set of L-rational points of U as U(L) = U ∩ Pn(L).
Definition 1.8 (Projective Variety). An algebraic set U is called a projective variety if
I(U) is a homogeneous prime ideal.
We would like a notion of dimension and non-singularity for projective varieties; we
rely on the corresponding definitions for affine varieties.
Definition 1.9 (Dimension). Let U ⊆ Pn be a projective variety, and let S be a copy of
An contained in Pn such that U ∩ S 6= ∅. The dimension of U is dimU ∩ S, interpreted
as a variety in S.
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Definition 1.10 (Non-Singular Point; Non-Singular Projective Variety). Let P be a point
in a projective variety U , and let S be a copy of An contained in Pn and containing P . We
say that P is a non-singular point of U if it is a nonsingular point of U ∩ S, interpreted
as an affine variety of S. Moreover, U is said to be non-singular if each of its points is
non-singular.
Finally, we define the function field of a projective variety, and regular maps.
Definition 1.11 (Projective Coordinate Ring; Function Field). Let U be a projective
variety. The projective coordinate ring of U is the set K[U ] = K[x0, x1, . . . , xn]/I(U). The
function field of U is the set
K(U) =
{
F (x0, x1, . . . , xn) =
f(x0, x1, . . . , xn)
g(x0, x1, . . . , xn)
and g 6∈ I(U)
}
/ ∼
where ∼ is the equivalence relation defined by f1
g1
∼ f2
g2
if and only if f1g2 − f2g1 ∈ I(U).
Definition 1.12 (Regular Point; Regular Map). An element F ∈ K(U) is called regular
at a point P if it can be written as F = f
g
where g(P ) 6= 0. A map F is called regular if it
is regular at every point in its domain.
Remark 1.1. At different points P , it may be necessary to take different functions f and
g.
1.2.3 Rational Maps, Morphisms, and Isomorphisms
Here we consider important classes of functions between projective varieties, of which
isogenies (Section 1.2.5) are a special case. As the name suggests, isogeny-based cryptog-
raphy uses isogenies of certain algebraic varieties to achieve key establishment and other
cryptographic goals.
Definition 1.13 (Rational Map). Let U1 and U2 be projective varieties. A map φ : U1 →
U2 is called a rational map if there exist coordinate functions f0, f1, . . . , fm ∈ K(U1) such
that φ(P ) = [fi(P )]0≤i≤m for all P ∈ U1 at which f0, f1, . . . , fm are all defined.
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If there is λ ∈ K\{0} such that λf0, λf1, . . . , λfm ∈ L[x0, x1, . . . , xn] for some L ⊆ K
we say that φ is defined over L. We are concerned with especially well-behaved rational
maps, called morphisms.
Definition 1.14 (Regular Point). Let φ : U1 → U2 be a rational map, and let P ∈ U1. We
say that φ is regular at P if there exists g ∈ K(U1) so that, if the coordinate functions for φ
are f0, f1, . . . , fm, then g · fi is regular at P for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and, moreover, there is 0 ≤
i∗ ≤ m such that (g · fi∗)(P ) 6= 0. When such g exists, we define φ(P ) = [(g · fi)(P )]0≤i≤m.
A rational map which is regular at every point of its domain is called a morphism. This
naturally leads to the definition of isomorphism of projective varieties.
Definition 1.15 (Isomorphism; Isomorphic Varieties). Let U1 and U2 be projective vari-
eties. We say that φ : U1 → U2 is an isomorphism if there exists a morphism ψ so that
φ ◦ ψ = ιU2 , the identity on U2, and ψ ◦ φ = ιU1 , the identity on U1. When such an
isomorphism exists, we say that U1 and U2 are isomorphic.
If an isomorphism φ : U1 → U2 is defined over a field L, we sometimes say that U1 and
U2 are L-isomorphic for the sake of clarity. From the perspective of algebraic geometry,
isomorphic varieties are indistinguishable, and so for geometric problems it suffices to
consider any fixed representative in an isomorphism class. We will use this fact later.
1.2.4 Elliptic Curves
Definition 1.16 (Elliptic Curve [33, Section III.3]). An elliptic curve E is a nonsingular
curve (i.e., a projective variety of dimension one) of genus one, with a distinguished point
O, called the point at infinity.
We say that an elliptic curve E is defined over a field K if it is defined over K as an
algebraic set.
The following proposition more concretely characterizes elliptic curves.
Proposition 1.1 (Characterization of Elliptic Curves [33, Section III.3, Proposition 3.1]).
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over K. Then:
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i. There exist functions X, Y ∈ K(E) such that the map
φ : E → P2(K)
φ : [x0, . . . , xn] 7→ [X(x0, . . . , xn), Y (x0, . . . , xn), 1]
is an isomorphism of E onto a curve given by the Weierstrass Equation
C : Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z
2 = X3 + a2X
2Z + a4XZ
2 + a6Z
3 (1.1)
for some a1, . . . , a6 ∈ K satisfying φ(O) = [0, 1, 0]. The functions X and Y are called
Weierstrass coordinates for E.
ii. Any two Weierstrass equations for E are related by a linear change of variables of
the form
X = u2X ′ + r
Y = u3Y ′ + su2X ′ + t
for some u ∈ K\{0} and r, s, t ∈ K.
iii. Every non-singular cubic curve C given by a Weierstrass equation of the form (1.1)
is an elliptic curve defined over K with distinguished point O = [0, 1, 0].
In light of Proposition 1.1, we will exclusively speak of elliptic curves described by a
Weierstrass equation of the form (1.1); moreover, for brevity of notation, we will often
consider the finite points of an elliptic curve E/K as being pairs (x, y) ∈ A2(K), with the
point at infinity being denoted only by O. Whenever we define a function in terms of these
coordinates, we will specify the image of O separately. In this formalism, we can write
E = {(x, y) ∈ A2(K) : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6} unionsq {O}. (1.2)
Remark 1.2 (Simplified Weierstrass Equation for Elliptic Curves). It can be shown (q.v.
[33, Section III.1]) that if charK 6= 2, 3 then the Weierstrass equation (1.1) can be further
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simplified to
C : Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3
so that Equation (1.2) becomes
E = {(x, y) ∈ A2(K) : y2 = x3 + ax+ b} unionsq {O}
for some a, b ∈ K, by a linear change of variables.
1.2.5 Isogenies
We can introduce group structure on an elliptic curve E in a natural way [33, Section
III.2, Proposition 2.2], and this group structure allows us to define a class of functions,
called isogenies, which preserve some of this algebraic structure, as well as the geometric
structure of the curves.
Definition 1.17 (Isogeny [33, Section III.4]). Let E and E ′ be elliptic curves defined
over a field K. An isogeny from E to E ′ is an algebraic morphism φ : E → E ′ such that
φ(OE) = OE′ .
We say that an isogeny φ : E → E ′ is defined over a field K if it is defined over K as a
rational map. The degree of an isogeny is its degree when considered as a rational map. If
φ is a separable isogeny, then deg φ = |kerφ| [9, Section 2].
For elliptic curves E and E ′, we say that E ′ is isogenous to E over K if and only if
there is an isogeny φ from E to E ′ defined over K such that φ(E) 6= {OE′}. It can be
shown (q.v. [33, Section III.6, Theorem 6.1]) that E ′ is isogenous to E over K if and only
if E is isogenous to E ′ over K; that is, the property of “being isogenous” is an equivalence
relation, and we defined the isogeny class of a curve E defined over K to be the set of
all curves E ′ which are isogenous to E, up to K-isomorphism as algebraic sets. Since any
algebraic morphism of curves is either constant or surjective [14, Chapter II, Section 6,
Proposition 6.8], if φ : E → E ′ is a nontrivial isogeny, then φ(E) = E ′.
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A theorem of Tate [36, Section 3, Theorem 1] says that if E and E ′ are defined over a
finite field K = GF (q), then E and E ′ are isogenous over K if and only if |E(K′)| = |E ′(K′)|
for every finite extension K′ of K.
Let E be defined over a field of characteristic p > 0, and for each ` ∈ Z, let E[`] denote
the set of `-torsion points of E. If p - `, the map
[`] : E → E
[`] : P → `P
is separable and has degree `2; hence, since E[`] = ker [`] is a finite abelian group, it must be
that E[`] ∼= Z/`Z⊕Z/`Z, since any other rank 2 Abelian group of order `2 has elements of
order strictly greater than `, by the Fundamental Theorem of Finitely Generated Abelian
Groups [31, Chapter 10, Theorem 10.20]. Additionally, either E[pr] = {O} for all r ∈ Z,
or E[pr] ∼= Z/prZ for all r ∈ Z [33, Chapter V, Section 3, Theorem 3.1]; in the first case
we say that E is supersingular, while in the second case we say that E is ordinary. Any
two isogenous elliptic curves are either both ordinary or both supersingular. We will be
concerned primarily with supersingular elliptic curves for our cryptographic applications.
Any supersingular elliptic curve E is defined over GF (p2) for some prime p, and for
each prime ` 6= p there are ` + 1 isogenies of degree ` with domain E (though not all of
them are defined over GF (p2), in general) [9]. These isogenies of degree ` are in one-to-one
correspondence with the subgroups Φ of E of order `; moreover, each such subgroup is
the kernel of a unique isogeny φ, and we write φ(E) = E/Φ [33, Chapter III, Section 4,
Proposition 4.12]. Hence to specify an isogeny it suffices to specify its kernel, and conversely
given a subgroup Φ of E we can construct the isogeny φ whose kernel is Φ, using Ve´lu’s
formulae [38]. In particular, if Φ is generated by a point R ∈ E(GF (p2)), then we have
a compact representation of φ, and we can compute φ efficiently knowing only R [9]. We
will use such isogenies in an authenticated key establishment protocol in Chapter 5.
1.2.6 The j -Invariant
Associated to every elliptic curve E defined over K is a number j(E) ∈ K, called the
j-invariant of the curve. As the name suggests, the j-invariant is invariant under K-
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isomorphisms of algebraic sets, and so a j-invariant uniquely identifies a K-isomorphism
class of elliptic curves over K. Given an elliptic curve E, its j-invariant can be found in
polynomial-time; moreover, given a j-invariant j∗ ∈ K, one can find in polynomial time
the curve E with j(E) = j∗. Knowing this, we have a compact description of an elliptic
curve for the purposes of communication during a key establishment protocol.
1.3 Fundamentals of Quantum Information
Quantum computers operate in a fundamentally different way from classical computers; we
briefly cover the fundamentals here, along with some further results that will be necessary
in later sections. For a more complete introduction see, for instance, [20] or [28].
In classical computing, the fundamental unit of information is the bit, which takes on
values in {0, 1}. In quantum computing, the fundamental unit of information is the qubit,
whose state can be any unit length complex linear combination of the standard basis qubits
|0〉 and |1〉2. That is, the state of a qubit can be written as
|ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉
for some α, β ∈ C with |α|2 + |β2| = 1.
Just as we can consider classical bit strings of length n whose states are in {0, 1}n, for
quantum computing we consider systems of many qubits. If we have some qubits in states
|ψi〉 = α(0)i |0〉+ α(1)i |1〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then their joint state is the tensor product
|ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψn〉 =
∑
σ∈{0,1}n
n∏
i=1
α
(σi)
i |σ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |σn〉 .
For brevity, for σ ∈ {0, 1}n we use the notation |σ〉 = |σ1〉⊗ · · ·⊗ |σn〉. More generally, the
state of an n-qubit system is a unit length complex linear combination
|Ψ〉 =
∑
σ∈{0,1}n
ασ |σ〉 .
2For concreteness, we can choose an orthonormal basis {~v0, ~v1} for C2, and define |0〉 = ~v0 and |1〉 = ~v1.
The state of a qubit is just a unit length vector in this space.
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Moreover, any setM of size at most 2n can be embedded in {0, 1}n and so we can consider
states of the form
|Ψ〉 =
∑
m∈M
αm |m〉 ∈ CM
by identifying |m〉 with |σ〉, where σ is the embedding of m in {0, 1}n.
1.3.1 Operations on Qubits
In contrast with classical computing, where, in principle, any bitwise operation can be
implemented, on a quantum computer all operations must be reversible and must preserve
the inner product on
⊗n
j=1C2 [28, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2, Postulate 2]. For any fixed
basis of
⊗n
j=1C2, this means that the admissible quantum operations are precisely the
unitary matrices of dimension 2n.
If n qubits are in some global state |Ψ〉, it is possible to apply a unitary operator to
some subset of them. If we apply the operator U on the first m qubits3 of the register,
the resultant state is U ⊗ I2n−m |Ψ〉; that is, the result is the same as if we had applied the
(also unitary) operator U ⊗ I2n−m to the whole register.
1.3.2 Quantum Function Queries
Given a function f : M→ T where (T ,+) is a group, we define the quantum gate Uf by
Uf : CM ⊗ CT → CM ⊗ CT
|m〉 |y〉 7→ |m〉 |y + f(m)〉 for all m ∈M, y ∈ T ,
extended linearly. Thus querying a function f on a superposition |ψ〉 of inputs is the same
as applying Uf to |ψ〉 |0〉.
3We can of course consider applying U to any m qubits of the register; we write only this result explicitly
for the sake of simplicity of notation. The result is similar.
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1.3.3 Measurements
Given a set of qubits in an unknown state, it is impossible to simply determine the state of
the qubits; rather, a measurement must be performed to extract some classical information.
Measurements are inherently probabilistic; in particular, if a set of qubits is in the state
|Ψ〉 = ∑σ∈{0,1}n ασ |σ〉 then for each σ ∈ {0, 1}n, the classical result of the measurement is
σ with probability |ασ|2.4
In principle, measurements can appear at any point of a quantum algorithm, and it is
possible that not all qubits will be measured at the end of an algorithm. However, the
following two principles say that it suffices to consider only those algorithms all of whose
measurements are at the end, and which measure all available qubits.
Principle of Deferred Measurement [28, Section 4.4]: Measurements can always
be moved from an intermediate stage of a quantum circuit to the end of the circuit; if
the measurement results are used at any stage of the circuit then the classically-controlled
operations can be replaced by conditional quantum operations.
Principle of Implicit Measurement [28, Section 4.4]: Without loss of generality,
any qubits which are not measured at the end of a quantum circuit may be assumed to be
measured.
These principles will simplify our analysis of key establishment protocols in Chapter 4.
1.3.4 Distinguishing Quantum States
A fundamental problem in quantum information processing is the following: given a register
which is known to be either in state |ψ〉 or state |φ〉, determine which is the case. The
following result is a corollary of the Holevo-Helstrom theorem.
Theorem 1.2 (Corollary of the Holevo-Helstrom Theorem). Suppose a register is prepared
in either state |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉, each with probability 12 . Any quantum algorithm which correctly
4In principle we can consider measurements in other bases; if {|ψi〉}2ni=1 is an orthonormal basis for⊗n
i=1C2, then we can measure |Ψ〉 in this basis—for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, the result is |ψi〉 with probability
| 〈Ψ| ψi〉 |2. Such measurements can be implemented as a unitary operator followed by a standard mea-
surement, and so no generality is lost by considering only the standard measurement.
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identifies b such that the actual state prepared is |ψb〉 succeeds with probability at most
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− | 〈ψ0| ψ1〉 |2. (1.3)
where 〈ψ0| ψ1〉 is the standard inner product of |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉. Moreover, for each such
pair of states, there is a measurement which succeeds with exactly the probability given in
Equation (1.3).
This theorem will be useful for analyzing the security of protocols in our security model
because the security definition in Chapter 4 relies on the computational indistinguishabil-
ity of certain quantum states. We will use Theorem 1.2 to show that certain quantum
states are indistinguishable provided that certain probability distributions are themselves
computationally indistinguishable.
1.4 Functions
We will require some useful notions about functions.
Definition 1.18 (Negligible Function). A function  : N → R is said to be negligible if,
for every polynomial function p(λ) which is positive on N, there is a constant λp so that
(λ) < 1
p(λ)
for all λ > λp. A function which is not negligible is said to be non-negligible.
Negligible functions frequently arise in cryptographic security definitions, and, intu-
itively, they are used in security definitions to account for the possibility of an adversary
accomplishing some task “by chance.” The following lemma gives a number of useful
properties of negligible functions that we will use in later chapters.
Lemma 1.3. Let δ(λ) and (λ) be negligible functions, and let q(λ) be a polynomial
function which is positive on N. Then
i. δ(λ) + (λ) is negligible.
ii. δ(λ) · (λ) is negligible.
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iii. q(λ)(λ) is negligible.
Proof. i. For any polynomial p(λ), let λ
(δ)
2p and λ
()
2p be such that
δ(λ) <
1
2p(λ)
for all λ > λ
(δ)
2p and
(λ) <
1
2p(λ)
for all λ > λ
()
2p .
Then for all λ > max{λ(δ)2p , λ()2p } we see that
δ(λ) + (λ) <
1
2p(λ)
+
1
2p(λ)
=
1
p(λ)
so that δ(λ) + (λ) is negligible, as required.
ii. For any polynomial p(λ), let λ
(δ)
1 and λ
()
p be such that
δ(λ) < 1 for all λ > λ
(δ)
1 and
(λ) <
1
p(λ)
for all λ > λ()p .
Then for all λ > max{λ(δ)1 , λ()p } we see that
δ(λ) · (λ) < 1 · 1
p(λ)
=
1
p(λ)
so that δ(λ) · (λ) is negligible, as required.
iii. For any polynomial p(λ), let λ
()
pq be such that
(λ) <
1
p(λ)q(λ)
for all λ > λ()pq .
Clearly this is equivalent to
q(λ)(λ) <
1
p(λ)
for all λ > λ()pq ,
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so that q(λ)(λ) is negligible.
Remark 1.3. Lemma 1.3.i. generalizes to the sum of polynomially-many negligible func-
tions.
1.4.1 Hash Functions
For many cryptographic purposes we require a function which is easily computable, and
maps input of arbitrary length to a fixed output length. This prompts the following
definition.
Definition 1.19 (Hash Function, adapted from [16, Section 8.1]). A hash function is a
function h which takes as input a binary string5 of any length, and returns a binary string
of some fixed (and in particular, finite) length, which can be computed in polynomial time
in the length of input.
Often when we want to use hash functions for cryptographic purposes, we require
them to have specific security properties. Typical cryptographic security properties are
stated as the inability for some polynomial-time adversary to accomplish some task, except
with negligible probability. Of course, in order for the notion of “polynomial-time” to be
meaningful, what we really need is a family of hash functions {hk} with a corresponding
security parameter. For instance, we might define the family of hash functions H =
{hp,g}p prime
g∈Zp
by
hp,g : Z→ Zp
x 7→ gx
and then define the security parameter on this family as λ = blog2 pc. Then a security
property of this family would be stated as “there is no polynomial-time algorithm which,
5As discussed in Section 1.3, we can interpret any input m as a binary string, and so we will use hash
functions with domains other than {0, 1}∗, keeping in mind that we simply embed the domain in {0, 1}∗
in some canonical way.
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given h chosen uniformly at random from H, accomplishes some task in time which is
asymptotically polynomial in λ”. We state some standard security properties of hash
functions here.
Definition 1.20 (Preimage Resistance). A hash function family H = {ht}t∈T is said to be
preimage resistant if there is no polynomial-time algorithm which, given h chosen uniformly
at random from H, and y ∈ imh, returns x ∈ domh such that y = h(x) with non-negligible
probability.
Definition 1.21 (Second Preimage Resistance). A hash function family H = {ht}t∈T is
said to be second preimage resistant if there is no polynomial-time algorithm which, given
h chosen uniformly at random from H, and x ∈ domh, returns x′ ∈ domh\{x} such that
h(x) = h(x′) with non-negligible probability.
Definition 1.22 (Collision Resistance). A hash function family H = {ht}t∈T is said to be
collision resistant if there is no polynomial-time algorithm which, given h chosen uniformly
at random from H, finds x, x′ ∈ domh such that x 6= x′ and h(x) = h(x′) with non-
negligible probability.
1.5 Computational Assumptions
Often in order to prove that a cryptographic protocol is secure we need that some under-
lying computational problem is hard in some sense—for typical security definitions such
as those given in Chapter 2, we need that the problem cannot be solved in polynomial
time on a classical or quantum computer. The problems that underlie most cryptographic
algorithms are in NP; that is, there exist polynomial-size certificates for “yes” instances
of problems that can be verified in polynomial time. A proof that such a problem has no
polynomial-time solution would prove that P 6= NP. Given that no such proof currently
exists, cryptographers make security assumptions ; that is, they assume that there is no
polynomial-time algorithm for a given problem. Then a typical security proof follows the
argument that, if an efficient adversary can break the security of a protocol, then the un-
derlying problem can be solved in polynomial time, breaking the hardness assumption. In
this section we give some classical examples of security assumptions. and then describe the
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security properties required for supersingular isogeny-based cryptographic schemes, which
appear in later chapters.
1.5.1 Polynomial-Time Reducibility of Computational Problems
In order to quantify security we would like to be able to determine the “relative hardness”
of computational problems—in particular, we typically want to say that compromising the
security of a cryptosystem is harder than solving some standard problem. To this end we
introduce the notion of polynomial-time reducibility.
Definition 1.23 (Polynomial-Time Reducibility). Let C and D be computational prob-
lems. We say that C is polynomial-time reducible to D, denoted D ≥P C, if there is an
algorithm A which, using a polynomial number of queries to an oracle which solves D and
polynomial time otherwise, solves instances of C.
The notation D ≥P C is meant to suggest that we are ordering problems by difficulty;
if C is polynomial-time reducible to D, then being able to solve D efficiently allows one to
solve C efficiently, and in that sense D is “harder” than C.
1.5.2 Examples of Classical Computational Assumptions
Factoring and the RSA Problem
Perhaps the best known public-key encryption scheme is RSA, which is based on the be-
lieved hardness of factoring and related problems. Because of its historical and instructive
value, we discuss the computational problems associated with RSA here, and refer to them
in Chapter 2 when we give examples of signature schemes.
Definition 1.24 (Factoring Problem for RSA Moduli). Given an RSA modulus n = pq
where p and q are distinct odd primes, the factoring problem is to determine p and q.
The corresponding computational assumption, called the factoring assumption for RSA
moduli is that there is no polynomial-time algorithm which solves the factoring problem
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for RSA moduli on arbitrary inputs with non-negligible probability, where the security
parameter is λ = min{blog2 pc, blog2 qc}.
The security of the RSA cryptosystem and signature scheme is based on the hardness
of factoring RSA moduli in sense that if factoring is easy, then these schemes are certainly
insecure. However, there is no known proof of the contrapositive statement; that is, if
factoring is difficult, then the schemes are secure. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient for
a security proof; to rectify the issue, the following computational problem was devised.
Definition 1.25 (RSA Problem [30]). Given an RSA modulus n = pq, an integer e ∈
(Z/ϕ(n)Z)∗ (where ϕ is Euler’s totient function), and a number c ∈ Z/nZ, the RSA
problem is to find cd (mod n), where d is the unique integer in Z/ϕ(n)Z which satisfies
ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(n)).
The RSA assumption is that there is no polynomial-time algorithm which solves arbi-
trary instances of the RSA problem with non-negligible probability. This assumption is
standard in classical cryptography. It is clear that
Factoring ≥P RSA.
Discrete Logarithms and the Diffie-Hellman Problem
Let G = 〈g〉 be a group of order n. For each h ∈ G there exists a unique x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1}
such that h = gx. We call this number x the discrete logarithm of h with respect base g,
denoted logg h.
Definition 1.26 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given a group G = 〈g〉 and an element
h ∈ G, the Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP) is to find logg h.
For a given group G, the Discrete Logarithm Assumption for G is that there is no
polynomial-time (in size of input) algorithm which solves arbitrary instances of DLP in G
with non-negligible probability.
For a group G = 〈g〉 of order n, we call a triple (a, b, c) ∈ G3 a Diffie-Hellman triple if
there are x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} such that a = gx, b = gy and c = gxy. There are two common
security properties related to Diffie-Hellman triples, which we state here
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Definition 1.27 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem [10]). Given a group G = 〈g〉
and two elements a and b with a = gx and b = gy, where x and y are not given, the
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) is to find gxy.
Definition 1.28 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem [10]). Given a group G = 〈g〉 and a
triple (a, b, c) ∈ G3, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is to determine whether
(a, b, c) is a Diffie-Hellman triple.
The Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption for a given group G is that there is no
polynomial-time (in λ = blog2 nc) algorithm which solves arbitrary instances of the CDH
problem in G with non-negligible probability; similarly, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption in a group G is that there is no polynomial-time algorithm which solves arbitrary
instances of the DDH problem in G with non-negligible advantage over 1
2
. For certain
groups, these assumptions are standard. Moreover, it is clear that for any group
DLP ≥P CDH ≥P DDH.
1.5.3 Post-Quantum Computational Assumptions: Supersingu-
lar Elliptic Curve Isogenies
Unfortunately, many classical security assumptions—including, in particular, all the ex-
amples in Section 1.5.2—are known to be incorrect when we consider quantum algorithms.
In particular, Shor’s algorithm [32] solves both the factoring problem and the discrete
logarithm problem in polynomial-time, completely invalidating the security of RSA and
discrete logarithm-based cryptosystems. To that end, in order to ensure the security of
classical communications once quantum computers are developed we develop classical pro-
tocols which are resistant to attacks by quantum computers. The security of the vast
majority of current post-quantum cryptographic schemes is based upon the hardness of
problems in four broad areas: lattices (e.g., NTRU [15] and variants [19, 8]), multivari-
ate polynomials over finite fields (e.g., Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar [21]; Hidden Field
Equations [29]), hash functions (e.g., Merkle signatures [25]), and algebraic codes (e.g.,
McEliece [24]; Niederreiter [27]). Recently, however, cryptographic schemes whose security
is based on the quantum hardness of computing isogenies between supersingular elliptic
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curves have been proposed [9, 35, 18]. These schemes have extremely promising security
and efficiency results, and the underlying security assumptions are, in some sense, very
similar to the Diffie-Hellman problems. We will use these security assumptions to build
a secure authenticated key establishment protocol in Chapter 5, and so we present them
here.
In the following definitions, let p = `eAA `
eB
B f±1 be a prime, where `A and `B are distinct
small primes, and f is a small cofactor used to ensure that p is prime—we make no effort
to quantify what is meant by “small.” Moreover, let E be a supersingular elliptic curve
defined over K = GF (p2) with E(GF (p2)) ∼= Zp∓1⊕Zp∓1, and let {PA, QB} and {PB, QB}
be bases for E[`eAA ] and E[`
eB
B ], respectively.
Definition 1.29 (Supersingular Isogeny Problem). Let φA : E → EA be an isogeny with
kernel 〈mAPA + nAQA〉 where mA, nA are chosen uniformly at random from Z/`eAA Z, not
both divisible by `A. The supersingular isogeny problem (SSI) is, given E,EA, φA(PB),
and φA(QB), to find a generator of ker φA.
Definition 1.30 (Supersingular Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem). Let φA : E →
EA be an isogeny with kernel 〈mAPA + nAQA〉 where mA, nA are chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from Z/`eAA Z, not both divisible by `A. Similarly, let φB : E → EB be an isogeny with
kernel 〈mBPB + nBQB〉 where mB, nB are chosen uniformly at random from Z/`eBB Z, not
both divisible by `B. The supersingular computational Diffie-Hellman problem (SSCDH)
is to find the j-invariant of
EAB = E/ 〈mAPA + nAQA,mBPB + nBQB〉
given E,EA, EB, φA(PB), φA(QB), φB(PA), and φB(QA).
Definition 1.31 (Supersingular Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem). Let φA : E → EA
be an isogeny with kernel 〈mAPA + nAQA〉 where mA, nA are chosen uniformly at random
from Z/`eAA Z, not both divisible by `A. Similarly, let φB : E → EB be an isogeny with
kernel 〈mBPB + nBQB〉 where mB, nB are chosen uniformly at random from Z/`eBB Z, not
both divisible by `B. Given a tuple
(E,EA, EB, φA(PB), φA(QB), φB(PA), φB(QA), EC)
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where either EC = EAB = E/ 〈mAPA + nAQA,mBPB + nBQB〉 or EC is sampled uniformly
at random from the set of all curves of the form
E/ 〈xAPA + yAQA, xBPB + yBQB〉
where xA, yA and xB, yB are chosen with the same conditions as mA, nA and mB, nB, each
with probability 1
2
, the supersingular decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (SSDDH) is to
determine which is the case.
As in previous sections, the corresponding security assumptions is that arbitrary in-
stances of the above problems cannot be solved in polynomial-time with non-negligible
probability (non-negligible advantage in the case of SSDDH). At the time of writing, the
best known quantum algorithm for these problems runs in fully-exponential time O( 6√p)
[4]; thus these problems seem well-suited to being cryptographic primitives. Finally, ob-
serve that
SSI ≥P SSCDH ≥P SSDDH.
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Chapter 2
Public-Key Cryptography
In this chapter we discuss the fundamental concepts in public-key cryptography which allow
us to achieve authenticated key establishment. In particular, we discuss unauthenticated
key establishment protocols, and consider signature schemes as an authentication method.
In order to give specific examples of quantum-safe signature schemes we will introduce
the quantum random oracle model and given generic constructions that amplify security
properties of signature schemes in this model. We also introduce chameleon hash functions
as a tool for these constructions.
2.1 The Quantum Random Oracle Model
2.1.1 Random Oracles and the Random Oracle Model
For the purposes of provable security, often we model hash functions with desirable security
properties as an idealized, completely random function called a random oracle. In this
paradigm, known as the random oracle model, an adversary in a security game can only
obtain hash values by requesting them from the challenger. The challenger can maintain
a table of hash values and, whenever an oracle call is made check the table for a matching
entry and returns it or, if none is found, generate a uniformly random value and records
it as the hash value for that input. The main benefit of this choice is that it prevents
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the adversary from using the structure of the hash function to obtain forgeries. Use of
the random oracle model is contentious among cryptographers since true random oracles
cannot be feasibly realized, and because it is known that there exist protocols which are
secure in the random oracle model but insecure when the random oracle is replaced by any
concrete hash function [6]. Nevertheless, because of their usefulness for provable security,
we use the random oracle model when necessary or when it greatly simplifies proofs.
2.1.2 Random Oracles in the Quantum Setting
When we move to the quantum setting, in recognition of the fact that any actual implemen-
tation will use a concrete hash function the most natural thing to do is to allow quantum
calls to the random oracle; this is known as the quantum random oracle model. It is easy to
see how this might cause trouble; it is not clear that the challenger can generate new ran-
dom values for queries to new inputs while at the same time maintaining consistency with
previously-returned hash values. For this reason, standard proof techniques in the classical
random oracle model do not necessarily translate well to the quantum setting. Fortunately
some progress has been made in developing proof techniques and constructions that work
in the quantum random oracle model (see, for instance, [37, 39]); in particular, in Section
2.4.4 we detail a construction due to Eaton and Song [11] which can be used to construct
a signature scheme which is secure in the quantum random oracle model from a signature
scheme which is merely secure in the classical random oracle model against an adversary
who can perform quantum computations. This construction will allow us to construct a
secure authenticated key establishment protocol in the model we present in Chapter 4.
2.2 Chameleon Hash Functions
Intuitively, chameleon hash functions, introduced in 1997 by Krawczyk and Rabin [22],
are a special type of hash function which are collision resistant for anybody who does
not know an associated piece of secret information, but for which collisions can easily be
found for any input given that piece of secret information. Since their introduction they
have been used to establish signature schemes with many desirable properties; particularly
non-repudiation, non-transferability, and recipient-specificity, which will not be discussed
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here. For our purposes, we will use these to construct signature schemes which are secure
in the quantum random oracle model. A precise definition of chameleon hash function is
given in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1 (Chameleon Hash Function (Adapted from [5, Definition 3.9])).
A chameleon hash function H is a tuple (KeyGen, H, Invert, Sample) of algorithms such
that:
1. KeyGen(λ) generates a private key/public key pair (sk, pk) with security parameter
λ;
2. Hpk(m, r) maps messages m to some target space Y ;
3. Sample(λ) samples r in such a way that Hpk(m, r) is distributed computationally
indistinguishably from uniform over the image of Hpk(m, ·) for every pair (pk,m);
4. Invertsk(h,m) produces r such that Hpk(m, r) = h (where (sk, pk) is generated
by KeyGen(λ)), with distribution computationally indistinguishable from that of
Sample(λ) conditioned on Hpk(m, r) = h; and,
5. For any pk, Hpk(·, ·) is collision resistant.
We say that a chameleon hash function is quantum-safe if the collision-resistance prop-
erty holds against a quantum adversary who can query the function in superposition.
2.3 Unauthenticated Key Establishment
Before discussing security models for authenticated key establishment we briefly discuss the
high-level idea of unauthenticated key establishment and provide some examples. Infor-
mally, an unauthenticated key establishment protocol is a way for a number of individuals
to exchange messages in public (i.e., potentially with eavesdroppers) and obtain a shared
secret key (i.e., some string that eavesdroppers cannot determine). Secrecy of the key is
typically derived from the assumed intractability of some computational problem. In the
two protocols we present, parties who wish to establish keys choose ephemeral secret keys
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from which they derive ephemeral public values, which they exchange. Each party then,
using the other’s ephemeral public value and their own ephemeral secret keys constructs
a session key; if the construction is suitably chosen they both get the same key. The
computational assumption then is that it is difficult to “combine” the two public values
without knowing at least one of the underlying secret values. The prototypical example of
an unauthenticated key establishment protocol is the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment
Definition 2.2 (Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment [10]). Suppose two parties A and B
wish to establish a key.
Global Parameters: Fix a cyclic group G of order n, and choose a generator g of G.
Ephemeral Key Generation: A chooses a ∈ Zn uniformly at random. Her ephemeral
secret key is a; her ephemeral public value is α = ga. Similarly, B chooses b ∈ Zn−1
uniformly at random. His ephemeral secret key is b; his ephemeral public value is β = gb.
Key Construction: A computes Ka = β
a = (gb)a = gab. B computes Kb = α
b = (gb)a =
gab. A and B share the same key.
Diffie-Hellman key establishment is illustrated in Figure 2.3
Global parameters: g,G = 〈g〉 , n = |G|
A B
a← Zn−1 b← Zn−1
α = ga β = gb
α−−−−−−−−−−−→
β←−−−−−−−−−−−
KA = β
a = gab KB = α
b = gab
KA = g
ab = KB
Figure 2.1: Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment
Notice that, by definition, if the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G,
then no eavesdropper can compute the secret key for an instance of the Diffie-Hellman
protocol. Unfortunately, since the discrete logarithm problem can be solved efficiently by
quantum computers, Diffie-Hellman key establishment cannot be quantum-safe.
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Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogeny Key Establishment
Definition 2.3 (Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogeny Key Establishment (SSIKE) ([9])).
Suppose two parties A and B wish to establish a key.
Global Parameters: Fix a prime p = `eAA `
eB
B f ± 1 where `A and `B are small primes; a
supersingular elliptic curve E defined over GF (p2) such that E[`eAA ] and E[`
eB
B ] are defined
over GF (p2), and; bases {PA, QA} and {PB, QB} for E[`eAA ] and E[`eBB ], respectively.
Ephemeral Key Generation: A chooses mA, nA ∈ Z`eAA , not both divisible by `A, uni-
formly at random. Letting φA be the isogeny with domain E and kernel 〈mAPA + nAQA〉,
her ephemeral secret key is (mA, nA) and her ephemeral public value is
α = (EA = E/ 〈mAPA + nAQA〉 , φA(PB), φA(QB)).
Analogously, B chooses mB, nB ∈ Z`eBB , not both divisible by `B, uniformly at random.
Letting φB be the isogeny with domain E and kernel 〈mBPB + nBQB〉, his ephemeral
secret key is (mB, nB) and his ephemeral public value is
β = (EB = E/ 〈mBPB + nBQB〉 , φB(PA), φB(QA)).
Key Construction: A computes
Ka = j (EB/ 〈mAφB(PA) + nAφB(QA)〉) = (E/ 〈mAPA + nAQA,mBPB + nBQB〉) .
B computes
Kb = (EA/ 〈mBφA(PB) + nBφA(QB)〉) = (E/ 〈mBPB + nBQB,mAPA + nAQA〉) .
We have Ka = Kb.
It is clear that if the supersingular isogeny computational Diffie-Hellman problem is
intractable, then an eavesdropper cannot compute the derived key using the public infor-
mation exchanged in an instance of this protocol. SSCDH is conjectured to be infeasible
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for a quantum computer, and so SSIKE is a candidate for post-quantum unauthenticated
key establishment.
2.4 Signature Schemes
Definition 2.4 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme is a triple (KeyGen, Sign,Verify),
where:
1. KeyGen is the key generation algorithm, which takes in a natural number λ and
outputs a key pair (sk, pk);
2. Sign is the (possibly randomized) signing algorithm, which takes in a message and
outputs a signature; and,
3. Verify is the verification algorithm, which takes in a message and signature and
outputs 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.
When Sign is not a randomized algorithm we say that (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) is determin-
istic, and otherwise it is non-deterministic; when a signature scheme is non-deterministic,
if we wish to specify the signature on a message m signed with key sk and randomness r,
we write Signsk(m; r).
A signature scheme is correct if, whenever (sk, pk) is a valid private key/public key
pair, Verifypk(m, Signsk(m)) = 1 for all messages M , and if σ is not a valid signature for
m under private key sk, then Verifypk(m,σ) = 0.
2.4.1 Security of Signature Schemes
As with any type of cryptosystem, we must define what it means for a signature scheme
to be secure; naturally, there are many possible security definitions. We present the most
common classical and quantum definitions here; these will be sufficient for results in later
chapters.
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Definition 2.5 (Strong EUF-RMA Security). A signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign,Verify)
is strongly existentially unforgeable against a random message attack (strongly EUF-RMA
secure) if the advantage that any polynomial-time adversary has at winning the following
game is negligible:
1. The challenger C runs the key generation algorithm on input 1λ to obtain the key
pair (sk, pk), and publishes pk.
2. The adversary A sends an integer t to C.
3. C selects messages m1, . . . ,mt uniformly at random, and computes σi = Signsk(mi)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. C returns {(mi, σi)}ti=1.
4. A produces (m∗, σ∗). A wins the game if (m∗, σ∗) 6= (mi, σi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
Verifypk(m
∗, σ∗) = 1.
We say that a signature scheme is weakly EUF-RMA secure if it satisfies the require-
ments of Definition 2.5 with the additional requirement that, in step 4. of the game,
m∗ 6= mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Definition 2.6 (Strong EUF-CMA Security). A signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign,Verify)
is strongly existentially unforgeable against an adaptive chosen message attack (strongly
EUF-CMA secure) if the advantage that any polynomial-time adversary has at winning
the following game is negligible:
1. The challenger C runs the key generation algorithm on input 1λ to obtain the key
pair (sk, pk), and publishes pk.
2. For i = 1, 2, . . . , t:
a) The adversary A sends a message mi to C.
b) C returns σi = Signsk(mi).
3. A produces (m∗, σ∗). A wins the game if (m∗, σ∗) 6= (mi, σi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
Verifypk(m
∗, σ∗) = 1.
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We say that a signature scheme is weakly EUF-CMA secure if it satisfies the require-
ments of Definition 2.6 with the additional requirement that, in step 3. of the game,
m∗ 6= mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
In Definitions 2.5 and 2.6, part of the win condition for the adversary in the game
is that the adversary’s output message/signature pair must not have been provided by
the challenger. These definitions are reasonable for classical security definitions, but they
break down when we consider an adversary who is allowed to obtain signatures on quan-
tum superpositions of messages; this is because there is not a reasonable notion of which
messages the adversary has asked C to sign. This necessitates the following quantum-safe
security definition.
Definition 2.7 (Strong EUF-qCMA Security). A signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign,Verify)
is strongly existentially unforgeable against a quantum adaptive chosen message attack
(strongly EUF-qCMA secure) if the advantage that any polynomial-time adversary has
at winning the following game is negligible:
1. The challenger C runs the key generation algorithm on input 1λ to obtain the key
pair (sk, pk), and publishes pk.
2. For i = 1, 2, . . . , t:
a) The adversary A sends a register in superposition of messages and target qubits
|ψi〉 =
∑
m,y αm,y |m〉 |y〉.
b) C returns USignsk |ψi〉 =
∑
m,y αm,y |m〉 |y + Signsk(m)〉
3. A produces (m∗1, σ∗1), (m∗2, σ∗2), . . . , (m∗t+1, σ∗t+1). A wins the game if the (m∗i , σ∗i ) are
distinct and Verifypk(m
∗
i , σ
∗
i ) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t+ 1.
We say that a signature scheme is weakly EUF-qCMA secure if it satisfies the require-
ments of Definition 2.7 with the additional requirement that, in step 3. of the game, the
messages mi are pairwise distinct.
The requirement that to win A must produce one more valid message/signature pair
than signing queries he makes is intuitively justified by the fact that the output of each
such query, when measured, will yield a valid message/signature pair, and so it is trivial
for A to produce t such pairs. The (t+ 1)th such pair is the forgery.
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2.4.2 Security of Signatures in Random Oracle Models
The security definitions presented in the previous section intentionally make no mention
of random oracles. For the purposes of this work we will always assume that a quantum
adversary has quantum access to any hash functions used in a protocol unless otherwise
specified. In the event that we do wish to specify the model in which the security prop-
erty holds, we modify the security property name appropriately; for quantumly-accessible
random oracles we append -QRO, and for only classically-accessible random oracles we
append -RO.
2.4.3 Examples of Signature Schemes
RSA Signatures
For the sake of demonstrating the concept, here we present arguably the simplest signature
scheme: RSA signatures [30, Section IV]. As might be expected from the name, the compu-
tational problem whose hardness underlines RSA signature is the RSA problem (Definition
1.25).
Definition 2.8 (RSA Signatures (Adapted from [30, Sections IV-VI])).
Global Parameters: A random oracle O.
Key Generation: On input 1λ choose two distinct primes p, q with blog2 pc = blog2 qc =
λ, and define n = pq. Choose e ∈ (Z\ϕ(n)Z)∗, and let d ≡ e−1 (mod ϕ(n)). The private
key is d. The public key is (n, e).
Signing: To sign a message m ∈ Z, compute σ = O(m)d (mod n). The signature is σ.
Verification: To verify a signature σ on a message m, compute σe (mod n). If the result
is O(m), the signature is valid; otherwise it is invalid.
RSA signatures are EUF-CMA-RO secure under the RSA assumption, but of course
they are not quantum-safe, since the RSA assumption does not hold against quantum
adversaries.
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Signatures from Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogenies
Here we present a signature scheme due to Sun et al. [35] which is secure even when the
adversary can perform polynomially-bounded quantum computations, under the SSCDH
assumption. This signature scheme is what is known as a strong designated verifier (SDV)
signature scheme; it differs from a standard signature scheme in that, in addition to the
signer, the verifier must possess a private key/public key pair used for verification. When
the signer wants to sign a message, he chooses an intended recipient and uses their public
key (along with his own secret key) to sign the message; then only the intended recipient
can verify the signature. For the purposes of authentication in key establishment, this in
some sense limited form of signature is sufficient, and we will use it to construct a secure
protocol in Chapter 5.
Definition 2.9 (Sun SDV Signatures [35, Section III]).
Public parameter setup: On input 1λ, choose two distinct small primes `S and `V ,
integers eS and eV , and a small cofactor f such that p = `
eS
S `
eV
V f ± 1 is prime, eS log2 `S ≈
eV log2 `V , and blog2 pc = λ . Choose an elliptic curve E which is supersingular and defined
over K = GF (p2), and bases {PS, QS} and {PV , QV } for E[`eSS ] and E[`eVV ], respectively.
These are the global parameters.
Signing Key Generation: On input 1λ, choose two integers mS, nS ∈ Z/`eSS Z, not both
divisible by `S, uniformly at random. The private key is (mS, nS).
Set RS = mSPS + nSQS, and define φS to be the isogeny with kernel 〈RS〉. Set
ES = E/ 〈RS〉. The public key is (ES, φS(PV ), φS(QV )).
Verification Key Generation: On input 1λ, choose two integers mV , nV ∈ Z/`eVV Z, not
both divisible by `V , uniformly at random. The private key is (mV , nV ).
Set RV = mV PV + nVQV , and define φV to be the isogeny with kernel 〈RV 〉. Set
EV = E/ 〈RV 〉. The public key is (EV , φV (PS), φV (QS)).
Signing: To sign a message m with private signing key (mS, nS) and public verification
key (EV , φV (PS), φV (QS)), compute
ESV = EV / 〈mSφV (PS) + nSφV (QS)〉 ;
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the signature is then σ = H(m||j(ESV )).
Verification: To verify a signature σ on m with public signing key (ES, φS(PV ), φS(QV ))
and private verification key mV , nV , compute
EV S = ES/ 〈mV φS(PV ) + nV φS(QV )〉 ;
the signature is valid if σ = H(m||j(EV S)).
Theorem 2.1 (Correctness of Sun SDV Signatures). The scheme described in Definition
2.9 is correct.
Proof. Observe that
ESV = EV / 〈mSφV (PS) + nSφV (QS)〉
= (E/ 〈mV PV + nVQV 〉) / 〈φV (mSPS + nSQS)〉
= E/ 〈mV PV + nVQV ,mSPS + nSQS〉
= (E/ 〈mSPS + nSQS〉) / 〈φS(mV PV + nVQV )〉
= ES/ 〈mV φS(PV ) + nV φS(QV )〉 = EV S;
the result follows.
Theorem 2.2 (Security of Sun SDV Signatures; Derived from [35, Proposition IV.1]).
Under the SSCDH assumption, the signature scheme described in Definition 2.9 is strongly
EUF-CMA-RO secure against an adversary who can perform polynomially-bounded quan-
tum computations.
2.4.4 Secure Signatures in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
We would like to use a signature scheme for authentication in an authenticated key es-
tablishment protocol which is secure in a post-quantum model where the adversary can
make quantum queries to oracles which emulate classical parties, and to any random or-
acles. For this purpose, it is clear that we require a signature scheme which is, at the
very least, EUF-qCMA secure in the quantum random oracle model (EUF-qCMA-QRO
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secure). Unfortunately, the Sun strong designated verifier signature scheme has only been
proven to be strongly EUF-CMA-RO secure. In this section we describe a construction
which yields a strongly EUF-CMA-QRO secure signature scheme from a strongly or weakly
EUF-CMA-RO signature scheme, which solves part of this problem.
Theorem 2.3 (Construction of Strongly EUF-CMA-QRO Signatures [11, Theorem 4]). Let
(KeyGen, Sign,Verify) be a signature scheme which is EUF-CMA-RO against a quantum
adversary, and let H = (KeyGen(H), H, Sample, Invert) be a quantum-safe chameleon hash
function. Define a new signature scheme (KeyGen(Q), Sign(Q),Verify(Q)) in the following
way:
1. KeyGen(Q)(λ):
(a) Set (sk, pk) = KeyGen(λ)
(b) Set (sk(H), pk(H)) = KeyGen(H)(λ)
(c) Return (sk(Q) = (sk, sk(H)), pk(Q) = (pk, pk(H)))
2. Sign
(Q)
(sk,sk(H))
(m):
(a) Set r(H) = Sample(λ)
(b) Set σ = Signsk(r
(H))
(c) Set M = O(m||σ), where O is a random oracle
(d) Set rI = Invert(sk
(H), r(H),M)
(e) Return σ(Q) = (σ, rI)
3. Verify
(Q)
(pk,pk(H))
(m, (σ, rI)):
(a) Set M = O(m||σ)
(b) Set r(H) = H
(H)
pk (M, rI)
(c) Output Verifypk(r
(H), σ)
The signature scheme (KeyGen(Q), Sign(Q),Verify(Q)) is correct; moreover, it is also
EUF-CMA-QRO secure.
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2.4.5 Generic Construction of EUF-qCMA Secure Signatures
In Section 4.5 we give a generic construction for a secure authenticated key establishment
protocol which uses an EUF-qCMA signature scheme as a subroutine; in order for this
to be useful, we of course need to have such a signature scheme. In this section we
present a construction due to Boneh and Zhandry [5] which yields an EUF-qCMA signature
scheme from a signature scheme which is EUF-CMA against an adversary who can perform
quantum computations, and quantumly-accessible random oracles.
Theorem 2.4 (Construction of EUF-qCMA Signatures [5, Construction 3.12]). Let S =
(KeyGen, Sign,Verify) be a signature scheme which is EUF-CMA against an adversary who
can perform quantum computations. Let Q be a set of pairwise independent functions, and
let H be a random oracle. Define S ′ = (KeyGen′, Sign′,Verify′) in the following way:
1. KeyGen′(1λ) = KeyGen(1λ).
2. To sign a message m with private key sk, choose Q ∈ Q and r ∈ {0, 1}k at random.
The signature is
Sign′sk(m) = (r, Signsk(H(m, r);Q(m)))
3. To verify a signature (r, σ) by a party with key pair (sk, pk) on a message m, we
compute
Verify′pk(m, (r, σ)) = Verifypk(H(m, r), σ).
The signature scheme S ′ is correct; moreover, if S is EUF-CMA-RO secure against an
adversary who can perform quantum computations, then S ′ is EUF-qCMA-RO secure, and
if S is EUF-CMA-QRO secure, then S ′ is EUF-qCMA-QRO secure.
Notice that the family Q of independent functions is only used to specify randomness
for input to the signing function, and so if the signature scheme is deterministic we can
simplify this construction by omitting Q. This observation is stated explicitly in the
following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. Let S = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) be a deterministic signature scheme. Let
H be a random oracle. Define S ′ = (KeyGen′, Sign′,Verify′) in the following way:
35
1. KeyGen′(1λ) = KeyGen(1λ).
2. To sign a message m with private key sk, choose r ∈ {0, 1}k at random. The signature
is
Sign′sk(m) = (r, Signsk(H(m, r)))
3. To verify a signature (r, σ) by a party with key pair (sk, pk) on a message m, we
compute
Verify′pk(m, (r, σ)) = Verifypk(H(m, r), σ).
The signature scheme S ′ is correct; moreover, if S is EUF-CMA-RO secure against an
adversary who can perform quantum computations, then S ′ is EUF-qCMA-RO secure,
and if S is EUF-CMA-QRO secure, then S ′ is EUF-qCMA-QRO secure.
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Chapter 3
Security of Authenticated Key
Establishment
In this chapter we present general notions of what a security model for authenticated key
establishment must do, and given examples of prominent security models. This will serve
to motivate the model and constructions in Chapter 4, and highlight the novelty of our
new security model.
3.1 Basic Format of a Security Model
We first fix some general terminology which is expounded upon in a security model. A
protocol is a set of procedures used to establish a secret key among two or more parties.
A session is a specific instance of an execution of a protocol. If a party P is establishing
a key in session Ψ, then the parties with whom it is (or at least believes it is) establishing
a key are peers to Ψ.
All communication among parties is routed through the adversary ; that is, if parties
wish to communicate, they send their messages to the adversary and indicate the intended
recipient. What exactly the adversary is allowed to do with these messages depends on
the goals of the model. For the purpose of modelling authenticated key establishment the
adversary should be able to modify messages arbitrarily, or even drop messages entirely;
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however, it is often useful to consider adversaries which are restricted to only delivering
messages which have been sent, and only to their intended recipient. These restricted ad-
versaries are eavesdroppers (rather than active adversaries) and so such a security model
models unauthenticated key establishment—as mentioned in Chapter 2, we can use unau-
thenticated key establishment protocols as building blocks for authenticated protocols.
A model must also specify what it means for a protocol to be secure. In the case of the
models presented here, security is defined in terms of a security game which it is infeasible
for an adversary to win with high probability (typically with non-negligible probability
or with non-negligible advantage). The game involves the adversary interacting with a
challenger in some way, and then being issued a computational challenge. If the adversary
successfully completes the challenge we say that the adversary wins the game.
Then a security model must define:
1. The capabilities of honest parties;
2. The capabilities of the adversary;
3. How the adversary can interact with parties; and,
4. The computational task used to define security;
these are the aspects of the security models that we focus on in this chapter.
3.2 The Bellare-Rogaway Model
Bellare and Rogaway were the first to formalize the notion of a security model for au-
thenticated key establishment [2], following in the footsteps of Goldwasser and Micali [13]
who formalized the notion of provable security of encryption schemes. In principle Bellare
and Rogaway’s model can be used to model protocols that achieve goals other than key
establishment, such as mutual authentication. We present the model in full generality,
and mention specifically how authenticated key establishment fits into the framework as
appropriate.
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3.2.1 Protocols
We begin with the formal definition of a general protocol, and then explain how an au-
thenticated key establishment protocol can be modelled in this way.
Definition 3.1 (Protocol). A protocol Π is a function which takes as input
1. 1λ: the security parameter;
2. i ∈ I ⊆ {0, 1}∗: the identity of the sender;
3. j ∈ I ⊆ {0, 1}∗: the identity of the intended partner;
4. a ∈ {0, 1}∗: the secret information of the sender;
5. κ ∈ {0, 1}∗: a record of the previous messages in this invocation of the protocol; and
6. r ∈ {0, 1}∞: the random input for the sender
and which outputs (m, δ, α) = Π(1λ, i, j, a, κ, r), where
1. m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the message to be sent;
2. δ ∈ {ε, 0, 1} is the decision made; and,
3. α ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the private output.
The intuition for Definition 3.1 is the following. Each party has an associated identifi-
cation string i ∈ I; the adversary A is not a party and has no such identifier. Parties can
have associated private information a—the “long-lived key”—which can be used during
key establishment; generally these keys will be established by a key generation algorithm
associated to a protocol, before the protocol is to be run. Once the security parameter,
identities, and secret keys are fixed, the output of the protocol depends only on the previous
messages received in a given session and potentially some random coin tosses.
Given these parameters, the output of a protocol includes an outgoing message (poten-
tially empty) to the party identified by j, a decision as to whether to accept the last received
messages, and potentially some private output. For key establishment, the private output
is the computed key, and the decisions indicates whether all messages received at this point
in the protocol have been accepted and hence whether a key should be constructed.
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3.2.2 Adversarial Model
The adversary A is a classical Turing machine with access to a stream of random bits and
oracles Πsi,j which model parties attempting to communicate; in particular, Π
s
i,j models
party Pi attempting to communicate with party Pj in session s, for any admissible i, j, s.
The adversary activates Πsi,j(x) to obtain the message (m, δ) that Pi would send to Pj in
session s upon receiving message x. We let κsi,j denote the concatenation of all messages
received so far by Πsi,j; setting
Π(1λ, i, j, a, κsi,j||x, rsi,j) = (msi,j(x), δsi,j(x), αsi,j(x)),
when A queries Πsi,j on input x, the oracle returns
Πsi,j(x) = (m
s
i,j(x), δ
s
i,j(x))
and we update κsi,j = κ
s
i,j||x.
For the purposes of authenticated key establishment we give the adversary the ability
to reveal a session secret αsi,j for an oracle Π
s
i,j. If the adversary has issued a reveal query
against an oracle that oracle is said to be open and is otherwise unopened. An oracle is
called fresh if it is unopened, has accepted, and has not engaged in a matching conversation
(defined in section 3.2.3) with an opened oracle.
We say that an adversary is benign if its action is restricted to choosing pairs (Πsi,j,Π
t
j,i)
of oracles and then faithfully relaying messages between them, in order. The notion of a
benign adversary will appear in the security definition for protocols.
3.2.3 Security Definition
The security definition for the Bellare-Rogaway model relies primarily on the notion of a
matching conversation. Informally, the conversation of an oracle is the ordered concate-
nation of all messages sent and received by the oracle in the run of a protocol; oracles
have matching conversations if the incoming messages of one’s conversation are the out-
going messages of the other (in order), and vice versa. Given this definition of matching
conversation, we can define security in terms of a security game.
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To begin, the adversary is provided with the necessary oracles for the game. The adver-
sary is allowed to interact with the oracles as usual and perform (classical, polynomially-
bounded) computations. The adversary must eventually choose a fresh oracle Πsi,j and issue
a test query. Upon receiving a test query, b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random and,
if b = 0 the correct secret key αsi,j is returned while otherwise a random string is chosen
according to Sλ, where {Sλ}λ∈N is the ensemble of distributions of session keys determined
by the protocol Π, indexed by the security parameter. After this query the adversary can
no longer interact with the oracles and must output a guess b′ to b; the adversary wins if
b′ = b. This security game is one component of the following security definition.
Definition 3.2 (Secure Key Exchange Protocol). A key exchange protocol Π with cor-
responding oracles {Πsi,j} i,j∈I
s∈{0,1}∗
is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model if the following
hold.
1. If A is a benign adversary who completes a session between Πsi,j and Πtj,i, then Πsi,j
and Πtj,i both accept; moreover α
s
i,j = α
t
j,i and this value is distributed over the space
of possible keys according to Sλ,
2. If two oracles have matching conversations, then they both accept and output the
same secret information α.
3. The probability of an oracle accepting when there is no adversary with a matching
conversation is negligibly (in the security parameter) greater than 1
2
.
4. The probability of the adversary correctly guessing the bit in a test query against a
fresh oracle is negligible in the security parameter.
Notice that this is an indistinguishability definition; that is, the adversary doesn’t need
to be able to construct a session key, but simply determine whether a revealed string is the
correct key for a session or not. This was in line with the philosophy of provable security
at the time when the model was proposed, and has perpetuated until the present; each of
the security models presented in this chapter will adopt this philosophy, as will the new
model we present in Chapter 4.
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3.3 The Canetti-Krawczyk Model
The Canetti-Krawczyk model [7] was designed with the philosophy that the most fun-
damental application of authenticated key establishment is to enable the construction of
secret keys for symmetric key encryption schemes for implementing secure communications
channels. To that end, the security model and definition used is such that if two parties
use a secure protocol to establish a session key and then use that key for a sufficiently
secure symmetric key encryption scheme, then the parties can be assured of the authen-
ticity and secrecy of the messages sent and received using that key, in contrast with the
Bellare-Rogaway model and related models. Moreover, while [2] focuses on the shared-key
scenario (when all parties share the same LL-key), in [7] the authors instead primarily
consider the public-key setting, where each party has their own private key/public key pair
to use for authentication.
3.3.1 Parties, Protocols, and Sessions
A party P is a polynomial-time machine with an associated secret key/public key pair
(sk, pk); for the purposes of the security experiment there are a polynomial number (chosen
by the adversary) of parties that can participate in key establishment. A protocol is a
specification of a set of subroutines used to establish keys; in particular these subroutines
specify procedures for responding to messages and other requests.
Parties can run arbitrarily many instances of the protocol; each such instance is called
a session. Each session is identified by a string s; session identifiers may be repeated, but
not twice at the same party. Sessions are initiated when the adversary issues a command
(P ,P ′, s, role) to party P ; in this case the peer is P ′ and session identifier is s. Parties
store session-specific information, such as the party’s role (initiator or responder), peer
(i.e., the party with whom a key is being established) ephemeral information and messages
sent and received in the session. Pairs of sessions initiated by commands (Pi,Pj, s, role)
and (Pj,Pi, s, role′) are called matching sessions.
After enough messages have been sent and received, a session terminates according to
the specifications of the protocol. At the time of session termination, either a session key
is computed or special output is produced indicating that the session is invalid; in either
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case the session’s owner records this result and deletes all other memory associated with
that session. We also allow for session keys to expire; when the adversary issues such a
command to a party, that party deletes the session key associated to the indicated session.
3.3.2 Adversarial Model
As in the Bellare-Rogaway model, the adversary A is a polynomial-time machine through
which all messages between parties are routed. The adversary interacts with parties by
delivering messages to them and issuing action requests (such as to begin a session).
To model secret information leakage the adversary can also issue SessionStateReveal,
SessionKeyReveal and Corrupt queries. As the names suggest, SessionStateReveal(s)
reveals all state-specific information a session’s owner has saved for a given session s, a
SessionKeyReveal(s) query reveals the session key (if the party has that key in memory)
for session s and Corrupt(P) causes the party P to become adversarially-controlled and
all that party’s memory is revealed to the adversary.
3.3.3 Security Definition
A session owned by party Pi is said to be locally exposed if its state or key have been
revealed by the adversary before it is expired, or if Pi is corrupted before it is expired. A
session is exposed if it or its matching session is locally exposed and is otherwise fresh. For
the security game, the adversary is allowed a single Test query; when this query is issued
on a fresh, complete, unexpired session s, the challenger will choose a bit b uniformly at
random. If b = 0 the true session key will be revealed, while if b = 1 and random key will
be revealed. At this point, the adversary continues to interact as usual with the parties,
except that he cannot expose the test session. Eventually the adversary gives a guess b′,
and wins the security game if b′ = b. This prompts the security definition:
Definition 3.3 (Secure Key Exchange Protocol). A protocol Π is secure in the Canetti-
Krawczyk model if the following hold:
1. If two parties complete matching sessions they output the same session key; and,
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2. The advantage any adversary has in guessing the bit used in a fresh, complete,
unexpired test session is a negligible function of the security parameter.
3.4 A Model for Quantum Cryptography
Once quantum computers become a reality, it will be possible (in principle, at least) to use
them to establish secure session keys. In particular, parties may use quantum computers to
compute values they otherwise couldn’t in polynomial time; or, more interestingly, parties
may exchange qubits as part of a protocol and use these qubits in key establishment. In
particular, in 1984, Bennett and Brassard [3] demonstrated a way to use quantum key
distribution to establish keys in an information-theoretically secure way in the presence
of an eavesdropper. In this section we present a security model due to Mosca, Stebila,
and Ustaog˘lu [26] which was designed to formally analyze the security properties of that
protocol, known as BB84, in an active adversarial model.
The model presented here is an extension of the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model [23],
which extends the Canetti-Kracwczyk model by giving the adversary new information-
reveal queries which do not necessarily immediately expose an associated session—this
means that the adversary is more powerful and can launch new types of attacks. We do
not cover these new queries here, because they are not the main technical contribution of
the security model in [26].
3.4.1 Parties, Protocols, and Sessions
In this model, a party P is a pair of polynomial-time machines (CP , QP), where CP is
classical, with source of random bits, and QP is quantum. The classical machine can
activate the quantum machine using a special activation request and can likewise receive
the results of quantum measurements. Both machines can have messages delivered to
them by the adversary. We assume that the link between the machines is noiseless and
perfectly secure; that is, the adversary cannot tamper with measurement values being
passed from QP to CP , and cannot interfere with activation requests sent from CP to QP .
For authentication parties may have an associated secret key/public key pair.
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As usual, a protocol is a collection of subroutines which output a shared secret key
among parties. In this model, some subroutines of the protocol may be quantum, and the
key is eventually returned by the classical machine. As well, a session is an execution of
a protocol at a party. Parties store session-specific information called the session state,
including a unique session identifier while the session is active, and when the session com-
pletes the and the classical machine outputs either ⊥ (a value indicating failure) or a tuple
(κ, id, ~v, ~u) where:
1. κ is the session key;
2. id is the party identifier of the peer;
3. ~v = (~v1, . . . , ~vt) is a vector of vectors of public values which bind the key to the public
information used in the session; and,
4. ~u = (~u1, . . . , ~ut) is a vector of vectors of public values used to authenticate the peer
identified by id in the session.
Intuitively, we think of ~vi as the session-specific public values provided by the j
th party
in the session (the public ephemeral value). The session key is, of course, kept secret.
Naturally, a protocol is said to be correct if whenever it is executed according to its
specifications and when all messages are relayed faithfully, the parties participating in
the protocol output the same key κ.
Aside from session keys, parties may store in memory value pairs of the form (x,X),
where x is a private value associated to a public value X; for instance, if parties are
participating in Diffie-Hellman key establishment, such a value pair might be (a, ga). This
value pair formalism is used to streamline the definition of special information-reveal queries
the adversary can perform.
3.4.2 Adversarial Model and the Security Definition
Like a party, the adversary A is a pair of machines (CA, QA) where CA is classical and
QA is quantum. The time and memory of these machines may be bounded; typically we
consider polynomially-bounded computation time and storage. The adversary performs
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computations and can interact with all the parties; in particular all communication (clas-
sical and quantum) is routed through the adversary. The adversary can also establish
dishonest parties and corrupt honest parties; parties cannot, a priori, distinguish between
honest and dishonest parties.
The information-reveal queries of the Bellare-Rogaway and Canetti-Krawczyk models
have been streamlined into a single Partner(X) query; when this query is issued to a party,
if that party has a value pair (x,X) in memory then the corresponding private value x is
returned; in the special case of Partner(Ψ) for a session identifier Ψ, the session key (if
it exists) is revealed. If the adversary has issued the query Partner(X) to a party that
has in its memory a value pair (x,X) then the adversary is said to be partner to X. The
adversary is never partner to X until it issues Partner(X).
This leads to the definition of a fresh session.
Definition 3.4 (Fresh Session). A session Ψ owned by an honest party P is said to be
fresh if:
1. The adversary has not revealed the session key for any session with the same public
output vector as Ψ (including Ψ itself);
2. For each ~vi there is some entry to which A is not partner; and,
3. For each ~ui there was, at the time of session completion, some entry to which A was
not partner.
Intuitively, this says that for a fresh session, the adversary must not have revealed
all secret authentication information for parties participating in the protocol before the
session was complete, and must never reveal all session-specific information for a party
participating in the session.
As in the Canetti-Krawczyk model, the adversary must eventually issue a Test query,
specifying a session. If the session does not yet have a session key, the returned value
is ⊥ and the adversary loses. Otherwise the challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at
random and, if b = 0, reveals the session key and if b = 1 reveals a randomly-chosen key.
The adversary can continue to interact with the parties in any way provided that the test
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session remains fresh, and eventually returns a bit b′. The adversary wins the game if
b′ = b. A protocol is secure if no adversary satisfying specified constraints on computation
time and memory can win this game with probability non-negligibly greater than 1
2
.
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Chapter 4
A Security Model for Post-Quantum
Authenticated Key Establishment
In this chapter we discuss our new security model for authenticated key establishment.
The primary difference between this model and the ones presented in Chapter 3 is that the
security definition for this model allows quantum interactions between the adversary and
quantum emulators for strictly classical parties, in much the same way that the security
game for EUF-qCMA security of signature schemes allows for quantum queries to a signing
oracle in order to create a stronger security definition. We then present a generic construc-
tion of a secure protocol using a signature scheme and a key establishment protocol which
is secure in a restricted model with a passive adversary.
4.1 Motivation
Whenever a security model is proposed, it is important to motivate the specific choices
made by the model; in particular, we would like to justify choices by considering their
implications in the context of real-world communications security and in the broader con-
text of theoretical cryptography. Most aspects of this model—parties, protocols, and the
concept of sessions, for instance—are standard and need no further justification; the most
fundamental change is allowing quantum queries to ordinarily classical procedures. In this
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section we make a case for this decision.
Perhaps the most natural justification of this decision is that protocols which are se-
cure in this model when run on classical machines remain secure when run on a quantum
computer instead. The use of this is clear: a quantum cryptographic routine could, in
principle, be simplified by having a subroutine that requires secure classical communica-
tions; for instance, in order to establish which bits are agreed-upon in the BB84 protocol
[3], parties must communicate classically. If a classical authenticated key establishment
protocol is known to be secure even when the adversary is allowed to pass quantum su-
perpositions of messages between parties, then parties to the larger cryptographic routine
can simply simulate classical computers running the protocol and still be assured of the
desired security properties.
In the context of theoretical cryptography, it is sometimes useful to have security defi-
nitions which are stronger than might be strictly necessary, so that protocols can be used
as parts of more complicated protocols with different security definitions, while still allow-
ing the security proofs to go smoothly. In this case, if a cryptographic protocol requires
an authenticated key establishment protocol as a subroutine, and its security definition
requires that the protocol must remain secure even when, for instance, there is an active
quantum adversary, then a key establishment protocol which is only known to be secure
in the Canetti-Krawczyk model with a quantum adversary may not be sufficient for the
purposes of the security proof. For this reason our new security model may be a useful
theoretical tool for constructing generic subroutines for more complicated cryptographic
protocols.
4.2 Definitions
4.2.1 Parties, Protocols, and Sessions
Definition 4.1 (Party). A party P is an interactive classical Turing machine with access
to a source of a random bits.
Associated to each party P is a (possibly empty) private key/public key pair (sk, pk).
For the purposes of the model, it is assumed that each party has a genuine copy of each
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other party’s public key—this is what will allow authentication. Moreover, to each party
is associated a unique identifier id—it is assumed that each party has a genuine copy of
each other party’s identifier.
Definition 4.2 (Protocol). A protocol Π is a specification of a set of subroutines, to be
run by some number of parties, for the purpose of establishing a session key.
A protocol Π is said to be correct if, when Π is executed according to its specifications
and when all messages are relayed faithfully (i.e., without changes to their content or
ordering), all parties involved compute the same key.
As in the security models presented in Chapter 3, protocols are message-driven; that
is, upon receiving a message, a party computes the response message and sends it to the
intended recipient. The party does no further computations and sends no more messages
until it is activated again by an incoming message.
Definition 4.3 (Session). A session Ψ is an instantiation of a protocol at a given party.
Associated to each session is a unique6 session identifier Ψ, chosen by the session’s
owner. If a party P owns a session Ψ, the parties with whom P believes they are attempting
to establish a key are called peers to P in session Ψ, and the peers’ associated sessions (if
they exist) are called matching sessions.
If a party P with identifier id who owns a given session Ψ, with matching session Ψ′
and peer P ′ with identifier id′ has received messages m1, . . . ,mk−1 in this session, then we
denote by
P(Ψ,Ψ′, id, id′; pk, pk′, sk;m1, . . . ,mk; rΨ)
the message that P sends given that the next message it receives in this session is mk, and
it uses randomness rΨ for this session. For brevity, we abbreviate this expression as P(mk)
if the other inputs are clear from context.
6Since parties need not consult one another, there is, in principle, the possibility that two parties may
choose the same session identifier for some sessions. This possibility can be eliminated by, for instance,
requiring that the session identifier contain the party’s identity.
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4.2.2 Invalid Messages
In a classical key establishment security model, it is typical to have a mechanism by which
a party can prematurely end a session in the event that it receives an “invalid” message;
what exactly constitutes an invalid message is defined by a given protocol, but typically an
invalid message is one which either does not make sense in the context of the protocol or
which fails to validate under the public key of the party believed to have sent the message.
If we are to allow the adversary to deliver quantum superpositions of messages, however,
it does not make sense to consider such termination for two reasons:
1. The party who receives the superposition of messages cannot simply read off the de-
livered messages, and thus cannot easily tell whether or not to terminate the session.
Measuring the state would collapse it and defeat the purpose of considering quantum
queries entirely.
2. Even if the party could read off the messages in the superposition, it is possible that
some messages in the superposition are valid while some are invalid. It is not clear
what should be done in this scenario.7
For this reason we introduce a special failure character ⊥ to be used whenever a session
would be terminated. We define P(Ψ,Ψ′, id, id′; pk, pk′, sk;m1, . . . ,mk; rΨ) =⊥ whenever
mk is an invalid message, and we further define all further messages in a session after
a response has been ⊥ to be ⊥. This formalism essentially allows a session to be in a
superposition of terminated and active.
4.3 Party and Adversarial Capabilities
Aside from classical computations, parties can issue a special Send(id,m) command; this
requests that the adversary deliver message m to the party identified by the identifier id.
Parties may store private/public value pairs (k,K) in memory, associated to sessions. In
7One might argue that a superposition of messages should be declared invalid if there is any invalid
message in the superposition with non-zero amplitude. This idea may appear natural, but it is not easily
implemented (see point 1.) and results in a weaker security definition than we propose.
51
particular, for a key establishment session Ψ a party may draw an ephemeral secret key
skΨ and derive a corresponding ephemeral public value pkΨ.
In order to make protocols meaningfully quantum-resistant, for the purposes of the
security experiment the challenger will provide a quantum messaging oracle OP for each
party P , defined inductively as follows. Before OP receives any messages in session Ψ with
matching session Ψ′ and peer P ′ with identifier id′, we define
OP(Ψ) |m1〉 |y〉 = |m1〉 |y ⊕ P(Ψ,Ψ′, id, id′; pk, pk′, sk;m1; rΨ)〉
for all m1 ∈ M; notice that the session Ψ considered by OP must be given as classical
input. OP then holds onto the first register, and returns the second. After receiving k − 1
messages, OP will be holding onto k−1 registers; when it is queried again, we can consider
its input as the first k + 1 registers of some global state
|Γ〉 =
∑
αm1,...,mk−1,mk,y |m1〉 · · · |mk−1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Held by Challenger
Provided by A︷ ︸︸ ︷
|mk〉 |y〉
∣∣µm1,...,mk−1,mk,y〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Remaining registers
.
Then its action is defined by
OP(Ψ) |m1〉 · · · |mk−1〉 |mk〉 |y〉 = |m1〉 · · · |mk−1〉 |mk〉 |y ⊕ P(mk)〉 .
If P does not own a given session Ψˆ, we simply define OP(Ψˆ) |m〉 |y〉 = |m〉 |y⊕ ⊥〉. For
simplicity, for the purposes of the security experiment, the adversary interacts only with
these quantum messaging oracles.
In addition to standard quantum computations, the adversary interacts with the quan-
tum messaging oracles by delivering (quantum superpositions of) messages to them. The
adversary may also issue the following:
1. RevealEphemeralKey(id,Ψ): If the party identified by id owns a session Ψ, the
challenger reveals any ephemeral secret key8 associated to the session and party.
8In this context, “ephemeral secret key” refers to session-specific information derived from the random
input; in particular, it does not depend on incoming messages or any other quantities. In this way, the
result of this query is strictly classical. This can be done without loss of generality.
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2. RevealPrivateKey(id): Requests the party identified by id to provide their private
key.
3. Corrupt(id): When this command is issued, the party identified by the identifier id
becomes adversarially-controlled; the adversary learns all classical information known
by the party, is given all quantum memory associated to the party, and chooses all
future actions it performs.
As well, the adversary may issue the following quantum query: RevealSessionKey(id,Ψ),
defined in the following way. If K(Ψ,Ψ′, id, id′; pk, pk′, sk;m1, . . . ,mk; rΨ) is the key that
the party identified by id would compute in session Ψ with peer identifier id′ and matching
session Ψ′, and it has so far received messages m1, . . . ,mk, then if the global state is
|Γ〉 =
∑
αm1,...,mk,y |m1〉 · · · |mk〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Held by Challenger
Provided by A︷︸︸︷
|y〉 |µm1,...,mk,y〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Remaining registers
,
the result of this query is defined by
|m1〉 · · · |mk〉 |y〉 7→ |m1〉 · · · |mk〉 |y ⊕K(Ψ,Ψ′, id, id′; pk, pk′, sk;m1, . . . ,mk; rΨ)〉 .
As a result of this query OP returns the first k + 1 registers of the global state (that is, it
returns the target register provided by the adversary, and the received message registers it
was holding).
4.4 The Security Experiment
A session Ψ owned by party P with peer P ′ and partner session Ψ′ is said to be “clean” if
all of the following are true:
1. At the time of session completion, neither P nor P ′ was adversarially-controlled.
2. At the time of session completion, A had not issued RequestPrivateKey(id) nor
RequestPrivateKey(id′).
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3. A has not revealed the ephemeral secret key for Ψ or Ψ′.
4. A has not issued RevealSessionKey(id,Ψ) nor RevealSessionKey(id′,Ψ′).
The security experiment is the following: the adversary issues a Test(id,Ψ) query on
a clean session Ψ owned by the party with identifier id, defined in the following way. The
adversary provides a target register |y〉, and the challenger selects b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at
random. If b = 1, Test(id,Ψ) acts like a RevealSessionKey query; if b = 0, the result is
defined by
|m1〉 · · · |mk〉 |y〉 7→ |m1〉 · · · |mk〉 |y ⊕R(m1, . . .mk)〉
where for each tuple of messages, R(m1,m2, . . . ,mk) is a random string in K with the stip-
ulation that if K(Ψ,Ψ′, id, id′; pk, pk′, sk;m1, . . . ,mk; rΨ) =⊥, then R(m1, . . . ,mk) =⊥.
In any case, all k + 1 of these registers is returned. We say that the key establishment
protocol Π is secure if for any polynomial time adversary A, the probability that A can
correctly guess the value of b is at most negligibly greater than 1
2
.
4.5 Generic Constructions for Secure Protocols using
Signature Schemes
In this section we discuss how to use a signature scheme to provide authentication to an
unauthenticated key exchange protocol. The idea is simple: if each party simply signs
every message that they send along with their identifier, the identifier of the intended
recipient, the session identifier and peer session identifier (if known), then any protocol
which is secure when messages are delivered faithfully becomes a protocol which is secure
even with an active adversary. More precisely, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let S = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) be a strongly EUF-qCMA secure signature
scheme, and let Π be a two-round key establishment protocol which is secure when the
adversary A in the security game is required to deliver all messages faithfully. Consider
the protocol Π′ with the following properties:
1. Each party P ′k has a key pair (skk, pkk) for S and, moreover, each party knows each
other party’s public key.
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2. Whenever an initiating party P ′I would send a message m, it instead sends the triple
(m,Ψ(I), σ), where
σ = SignskI (m, idI , idR,Ψ
(I))
where idR is the identifier of the intended recipient, and Ψ
(I) is the session in which
the message is being sent.
3. Whenever a responding party P ′R would respond to a message (m,Ψ(I), σ) from an
initiating party P ′I with a message m′, it computes b = VerifypkI (m, idI , idR,Ψ(I), σ).
If b = 0, P ′R responds with (⊥,⊥,⊥); otherwise, P ′R computes
σ′ = SignskR(m
′, idI , idR,Ψ(I),Ψ(R))
and responds with (m′,Ψ(R), σ′).
4. Whenever a party Pk would compute a session key for a session Ψ(k) with partner
P` and partner session Ψ(`), it determines whether the signature in the message it
received was valid; if not it outputs session key ⊥. If the signature is valid, it outputs
the session key as usual.
The protocol Π′ is secure.
To prove Theorem 4.1, we will first show that no adversary can construct messages
for which the probability amplitude of correctly-signed messages that were not sent in
a clean session is non-negligible by using such an adversary as a signature forger in the
strongly EUF-qCMA game. Then, given that the probability amplitude of a valid unsent
message is negligible, we show that any adversary that distinguishes a superposition of
session keys from a superposition of random strings breaks the security of the underlying
unauthenticated key establishment protocol, contradicting the assumptions of the theorem,
and thus establishing the security of this new protocol.
For the first part of the argument, we must first show how, given an instance (pk) of
the strongly EUF-qCMA game, we can emulate a quantum messaging oracle OPk for a
party Pk with public key pk for S.
For an unauthenticated key exchange protocol Π, let the parties be denoted by Pk for
some values of k, and for each such party let P ′k denote the corresponding party for protocol
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Π′ defined as in Theorem 4.1. Notice that
P ′k(m,σ) =
{
(Pk(m), SignskPk (Pk(m)) if VerifypkP′ (m,σ) = 1
(⊥,⊥) otherwise .
Then, to emulate the quantum messaging oracle, first write P(m) to an auxiliary register
to obtain ∑
m,σ,y
αm,σ |m〉 |σ〉 |P(m)〉 |y〉 .
Use the strongly EUF-qCMA signing oracle on the third register to obtain∑
m,σ,y
αm,σ |m〉 |σ〉 |P(m)〉 |Signsk(P(m))〉 |y〉 .
Then apply UVerify, defined by
UVerify : |m〉 |σ〉 |m′〉 |σ′〉 |y〉 |z〉 7→
{
|m〉 |σ〉 |m′〉 |σ′〉 |y ⊕m′〉 |z ⊕ σ′〉 if Verify(m,σ) = 1
|m〉 |σ〉 |m′〉 |σ′〉 |y⊕ ⊥〉 |z⊕ ⊥〉 otherwise
to obtain ∑
m,σ,y
αm,σ |m〉 |σ〉 |P(m)〉 |Signsk(P(m))〉 |y ⊕ P(m,σ)〉 ;
the last register is the one we give to A. Note in particular that we are holding onto
the registers that contain valid message/signature pairs; in fact, we hold one such pair of
registers for each query we make to the signing oracle. It follows that if we can persuade A
to send us a pair of registers which, when measured, yield a valid message-signature pair
different from those that we will obtain by measuring the registers we already hold, then
with non-negligible probability we can win the strongly EUF-qCMA game.
Knowing that we can use the quantum signing oracle for the strongly EUF-qCMA
game to emulate a quantum messaging oracle for a party, we show that the security of
the signature scheme restricts the class of messages that an adversary can construct. The
results are presented in the following technical lemmas.
We first demonstrate two restrictions that we can place on the behaviour of A without
loss of generality.
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Lemma 4.2. Suppose there is an adversary A who wins the security game for Π′ with
advantage Adv who delivers two or more messages to a single party in a given session.
Then there is an adversary A′ who wins the security game for Π′ with the same advantage
who never delivers two or more messages to a single party in a given session.
Proof. The response to any message delivered to a party in a given session beyond the first
is (⊥,⊥); this is because Π is a two-round key establishment protocol and so any message
delivered beyond the first is invalid. Let A′ be defined as A is, except that whenever A′
would deliver the second message to a party in a given session, it instead simply writes
(⊥,⊥) to its target register. It is clear that A′ wins the security game with the same
probability as A.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose there is an adversary A who wins the security game for Π′ with
advantage Adv, and who at some point sends the last register of the global state
|Γ〉 =
∑
~µ,m,σ
α~µ,m,σ |~µ〉 |m,σ〉
to a responding party PR in session Ψ′, who believes they are participating in a session Ψ
with initiating party PI , such that ∑
VerifyskI
(m,σ)=1
∑
~µ
|α~µ,m,σ|2
is negligible. Then there is an adversary A′ who wins the security game with advantage
Adv′ which differs only negligibly from Adv, such that A′ never sends a register in such a
state.
Proof. Let A be such an adversary. First we show that Ψ′ cannot possibly be the session
on which A will choose to be tested. Suppose to the contrary that Ψ′ is the test session.
The global state after the Test query will be
|Γ〉 =
∑
VerifyskI
(m,σ)=0
∑
~µ
α~µ,m,σ |~µ〉 |m,σ〉 |⊥〉+
∑
VerifyskI
(m,σ)=1
∑
~µ
α~µ,m,σ |~µ〉 |m,σ〉 |κb(m)〉
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where κb(m) is either a correct key for session Ψ
′ on incoming message m, or a random
string; in particular, in either case is it not ⊥.
Consider the state
|Γ′〉 =
∑
VerifyskI
(m,σ)=0
∑
~µ
α~µ,m,σ |~µ〉 |m,σ〉 |⊥〉+
∑
VerifyskI
(m,σ)=1
∑
~µ
α~µ,m,σ |~µ〉 |m,σ〉 |r(m)〉
for randomly chosen strings r(m). In particular, observe that the ensembles D = {Dλ,r}
and D′ = {Dλ,r} of measurement outcomes of |Γ〉 and |Γ′〉 (parameterized by the secu-
rity parameter and random input) are computationally indistinguishable by the previous
lemma, since if they were not, we could distinguish |Γ〉 from |Γ′〉 with non-negligible ad-
vantage. In particular, in this case this means that if A were instead given |Γ′〉, and then
performed his measurement in order to guess the value b, the result would, except with
negligible probability, be indistinguishable from the result of measuring |Γ〉, regardless of
the value of b. Since |Γ′〉 carries no information about b, A can’t possibly guess b by
measuring |Γ′〉 with probability different from 1
2
. Thus when measuring |Γ〉 and guessing,
A guesses correctly with probability at most negligibly greater than 1
2
, contradicting our
assumption. Hence Ψ′ cannot be the test session.
By a similar argument, A can construct a register that is indistinguishable from the
response PR would give on this input register. Hence A′ proceeds exactly as A would,
except that whenever he would send a register as described in the statement of the lemma,
he instead constructs an indistinguishable register.
SinceA deals with at most polynomially-many registers, we can make as many substitu-
tions of this kind as required and the probability that the resultant state is distinguishable
from the correct state is negligible; hence, A′, defined in this way, wins the security game
with advantage at most negligibly different from Adv, as required.
Hence we can assume without loss of generality that our adversary A never delivers
more than one message in a session and never delivers a superposition of messages for
which the total probability amplitude of the valid content is negligible. This will allow
us to use an adversary A who delivers a superposition of messages in a session for which
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the amplitude of a valid, but unsent, message is non-negligible as a forger for a signature
scheme; this tells us then that the probability of the adversary delivering such a message
is negligible.
Lemma 4.4. Let A be an adversary who wins the security game with non-negligible
advantage. Let
|Γ〉 =
∑
~µ,mI ,σI
α~µ,mI ,σI |~µ〉 |mI , σI〉
be the global state after the last register is delivered by A to PR in a clean session. Further,
let (m∗, σ∗) be the message and signature that PI would send in this session. Let
F = {(mI , σI) : VerifypkI (mI , σI) = 1 and (mI , σI) 6= (m∗I , σ∗I )}
be the set of potential “forgeries.” If (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) is strongly EUF-qCMA, then
except with negligible probability, the quantity Φ, defined by
Φ ≡
∑
~µ,(mI ,σI)∈F
|α~µ,mI ,σI |2
is negligible.
Proof. We show how to forge a signature against (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) in the strongly
EUF-qCMA game if Φ is non-negligible.
Suppose we are given an instance (pk) of the EUF-qCMA game. We will run A es-
sentially as normal, by establishing public key/private key pairs for as many parties as
A requires; for one party Pi∗ chosen at random, however, we will set their private key as
pk (and the underlying secret key will remain unknown to us). With probability at least
1
p(λ)
, where p(λ) is a bound on the number of parties A requires (and which is at most
polynomial in λ), we have selected the initiator of this clean session. In particular this
means that, at least until the session is over, A will not issue RequestPrivateKey(idi∗),
and so we will not have to produce it. Whenever a party needs to sign a message we use
their private key, unless that party is Pi∗ , in which case we simply use the signing oracle
from the strongly EUF-qCMA game, as described above. Notice that by our assumption
that A never delivers two or more messages to a party in the same session, each time we
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query the signing oracle we are querying it for a different session; since the session identifier
is included in the signed message, this means that, in particular, if we measure the results
of our queries to the signing oracle we will never obtain the same message/signature pairs.
Moreover, because of the construction we use to model the party from the signing oracle,
each use of the signing oracle results in a register which will, with probability 1, yield a
valid message/signature pair upon measurement. In particular, this means that if A ever
sends us a superposition of messages for which the probability amplitude of a forged mes-
sage is non-negligible, then by measuring that register and the registers we hold, we will
obtain q+ 1 distinct valid message/signature pairs, where q is the number of calls we have
made to the signing oracle.
A will perform some unitary operations on the qubits he holds; thus the global state
becomes
|Γ〉 =
∑
~µ,mI ,σI
α~µ,mI ,σI |~µ〉 |m∗, σ∗〉 |mI , σI〉
and A sends the last register to PR (i.e., to us). If we now measure the qubits we hold, then
with probability Φ, we will obtain q+1 valid message/signature pairs. If Φ is non-negligible,
we can win the strongly EUF-qCMA game for our signature scheme; since the signature
scheme is strongly EUF-qCMA, this forgery can occur with at most negligible probability,
and so the probability that Φ
p(λ)
is non-negligible (and hence that Φ is non-negligible) is
negligible, as required.
Lemma 4.5. Let
|Γ〉 =
∑
~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |~µ〉 |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉
be the global state after the completion of a clean session Ψ owned by PR, the responding
party, where the second register is the message register sent by A to PR, and the third is
the message register sent by A to PI , the initiating party, if it exists. Let (m∗I , σ∗I ) be the
message and signature that would actually be sent by PI in step 3e of the protocol, and let
(m∗R, σ
∗
R) be the message and signature that PR would respond with if the messages were
relayed faithfully. Let
F = {(mI , σI ,mR, σR) : Verifypkι(mι, σι) = 1 and (mι, σι) 6= (m∗ι , σ∗ι ) for some ι ∈ {I, R}}
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be the set of potential tuples containing a “forged” signature. If (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) is
strongly EUF-qCMA, then, except with negligible probability, the quantity Φ, defined by
Φ ≡
∑
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈F
∑
~µ
|α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |2
is negligible.
Proof. Define
FI = {(mI , σI ,mR, σR) ∈ F : VerifypkI (mI , σI) = 1 and (mI , σI) 6= (m∗I , σ∗I )}, and
F¬I = {(mI , σI ,mR, σR) ∈ F : VerifypkI (mI , σI) = 0 or (mI , σI) = (m∗I , σ∗I )}
and observe that F = FI unionsqF¬I . By Lemma 4.4, we know that
ΦI =
∑
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈FI
∑
~µ
|α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |2
is negligible. Then we need only prove that
Φ¬I =
∑
(mI ,σImR,σR)∈F¬I
∑
~µ
|α~µ,mR,σR,mI ,σI |2
is negligible, since Φ = ΦI + Φ¬I . As in the proof of lemma 4.4, we can try to win the
EUF-qCMA game by choosing a random party P and hoping that A “forges” a signature
against them; then we measure the registers we hold to obtain a forgery. This succeeds
with probability at least Φ¬I , and so this quantity must be negligible except with negligible
probability, as required.
Lemma 4.6. Let
|Γ〉 =
∑
m∈M
αm |m〉+
∑
c∈C
αc |c〉 and
|Γ′〉 =
∑
m∈M
αm |m〉+
∑
c∈C
αc |r(c)〉
be normalized quantum states, where M and C are disjoint, nonempty, finite sets, r(c) 6∈M
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for all c ∈ C, and ∑c∈C |αc|2 is negligible. Then the advantage that any adversary has in
distinguishing |Γ〉 from |Γ′〉 is negligible.
Proof. Note that 1 − | 〈Γ| Γ′〉 |2 ≤ 2∑c∈C |αc|2. The result then follows from the Holevo-
Helstrom theorem.
Lemma 4.7. Consider the following state distinguishing game for some fixed quantum
states states |Γ0〉, |Γ1〉, |Γ′0〉 and |Γ′1〉:
i. C selects b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and sends |Γb〉 to A.
ii. A performs some computations and outputs a guess b′.
iii. A wins if b′ = b.
Let A be an adversary for this game, and now consider the following game:
i. C selects b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and sends |ψb〉 to A.
ii. A performs some computations and outputs a guess b′.
iii. A wins if b′ = b.
The probability that A wins the second game differs from the probability that A wins the
first game by at most
1
2
(√
1− | 〈Γ0| Γ′0〉 |2 +
√
1− | 〈Γ1| Γ′1〉 |2
)
Proof. Consider the problem of distinguishing |Γ0〉 from |Γ′0〉. By Theorem 1.2 the advan-
tage that any procedure has in distinguishing these two states is at most 1
2
√
1− | 〈Γ0| Γ′0〉 |2.
Consider the following distinguishing procedure: given a state |Γ′′0〉 which is either in
the state |Γ0〉 or |Γ′0〉, each with probability 12 , give the state to A. If A produces the guess
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b′ = 0, guess that the state is |Γ0〉, and otherwise guess that the state is |Γ′0〉. Then
P [This Procedure is Correct] = P [b′ = 0 ∧ |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ0〉] + P [b′ = 1 ∧ |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉]
= P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ0〉] · P [|Γ′′0〉 = |Γ0〉]
+ P [b′ = 1| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉] · P [|Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉]
=
1
2
P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ0〉]
+
1
2
(1− P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉])
so that
P [This Procedure is Correct] =
1
2
+
1
2
(P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ0〉]− P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉])
If this quantity is not at least 1
2
, we obtain a strictly better procedure by switching our
guesses; in any case, there is a procedure that can be used to distinguish |Γ0〉 from |Γ′0〉
with advantage 1
2
(P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ0〉]− P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉]), and so
|P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ0〉]− P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉]| ≤
√
1− | 〈Γ0| Γ′0〉 |2.
A similar argument gives that
|P [b′ = 1| |Γ′′1〉 = |Γ1〉]− P [b′ = 1| |Γ′′1〉 = |Γ′1〉]| ≤
√
1− | 〈Γ1| Γ′1〉 |2.
Let |Γ〉 be the state given to A in the first game, and |Γ′〉 be the state given to A in
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the second game. Then
|P [A wins the first game]− P [A wins the second game]|
= |P [b′ = 0 ∧ |Γ〉 = |Γ0〉] + P [b′ = 1 ∧ |Γ〉 = |Γ1〉]
− P [b′ = 0 ∧ |Γ′〉 = |Γ′0〉]− P [b′ = 1 ∧ |Γ′〉 = |Γ′1〉]|
≤ |P [b′ = 0| |Γ〉 = |Γ0〉]P [|Γ〉 = |Γ0〉]− P [b′ = 0| |Γ′′0〉 = |Γ′0〉]P [|Γ′〉 = |Γ0〉]|
+ |P [b′ = 1| |Γ〉 = |Γ1〉]P [|Γ〉 = |Γ1〉]− P [b′ = 1| |Γ′′1〉 = |Γ′1〉]P [|Γ′〉 = |Γ1〉]|
≤1
2
(√
1− | 〈Γ0| Γ′0〉 |2 +
√
1− | 〈Γ1| Γ′1〉 |2
)
as required.
Corollary 4.8. Suppose the global state in an instance of the security experiment for the
protocol just before the Test query is issued by A be
|Γ〉 =
∑
~µ
α~µ,m∗I ,σ∗I ,m∗R,σ∗R |m∗I , σ∗I 〉 |m∗R, σ∗R〉
+
∑
~µ
VerifypkI
(mI ,σI)=0
or VerifypkR (mR,σR)=0
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |m∗I , σ∗I 〉 |m∗R, σ∗R〉
+
∑
~µ
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈F
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |m∗I , σ∗I 〉 |m∗R, σ∗R〉
where (m∗I , σ
∗
I ) is the message/signature pair that would actually have been sent by the
initiating party in the test session, and (m∗R, σ
∗
R) is the corresponding response. After the
Test query is issued, the challenger selects b uniformly at random from {0, 1}, and should
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return the last three registers of the global state
|Γb〉 =
∑
~µ
α~µ,m∗I ,σ∗I ,m∗R,σ∗R |m∗I , σ∗I 〉 |m∗R, σ∗R〉 |κb(m∗I ,m∗R)〉
+
∑
~µ
VerifypkI
(mI ,σI)=0
or VerifypkR (mR,σR)=0
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉 |⊥〉
+
∑
~µ
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈F
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉 |κb(mI ,mR)〉
to A, where as before κ0(mI ,mR) is the session key corresponding to messages mI ,mR and
κ1(mI ,mR) is simply a random function. If instead C returns the last three registers of the
state
|Γ′b〉 =
∑
~µ
α~µ,m∗I ,σ∗I ,m∗R,σ∗R |m∗I , σ∗I 〉 |m∗R, σ∗R〉 |κb(m∗I ,m∗R)〉
+
∑
~µ
VerifypkI
(mI ,σI)=0
or VerifypkR (mR,σR)=0
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉 |⊥〉
+
∑
~µ
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈F
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉 |κ1(mI ,mR)〉
then except with negligible probability, the probability that A guesses the value of b cor-
rectly given this state differs at most negligibly from the probability that A guesses the
value of b correctly given |Γb〉, regardless of the value of b.
Corollary 4.9. Let |Γ〉 be drawn from one of the following distributions, each with prob-
ability 1
2
:
∆ :
∑
~µ
α∗~µ |~µ〉 |m∗〉+
∑
~µ;m∈M
α~µ,m |~µ〉 |m〉+
∑
~µ; c∈C
α~µ,c |~µ〉 |c〉 for m∗ ← D and
∆ˆ :
∑
~µ
α∗~µ |~µ〉 |mˆ∗〉+
∑
~µ;m∈M
α~µ,m |~µ〉 |m〉+
∑
~µ; c∈C
α~µ,c |~µ〉 |r(c)〉 for mˆ∗ ← Dˆ
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where D and D′ are probability distributions on some set, M , C, and the supports of D and
Dˆ are disjoint, finite, nonempty sets, r(c) 6∈M for all c ∈ C, and ∑~µ; c∈C |αc|2 is negligible.
Then if there is an efficient quantum adversary A which determines from which distribution
|Γ〉 is drawn with non-negligible advantage Adv, then there is an efficient procedure, using
A as a subroutine, which distinguishes D from Dˆ with non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Let A be as described. Suppose you are given m˜ and wish to know from which
distribution it is drawn. Construct the state
|Γ′〉 =
∑
~µ
α∗~µ |~µ〉 |m˜〉+
∑
~µ;m∈M
α~µ,m |~µ〉 |m〉+
∑
~µ; c∈C
α~µ,c |~µ〉 |c〉 .
Notice that if m˜ is drawn from D then |Γ′〉 is drawn from ∆, while if m˜ is drawn from Dˆ,
then
√
1− | 〈Γ| Γ′〉 |2 is negligible; hence the probability that A wins the game given |Γ′〉
differs only negligibly from the probability that A wins the game given a true sample from
∆ or ∆ˆ by Lemma 4.7.
We will guess that m˜ is drawn from D if A guesses that |Γ′〉 is drawn from ∆, and we
guess that m˜ is drawn from Dˆ if A guesses that |Γ′〉 is drawn from ∆ˆ. The probability
that we guess correctly is then
P [We guess correctly]
= P [A guesses ∆ | m˜← D] + P [A guesses ∆ˆ | m˜← Dˆ]
≥ P [A guesses ∆ | |Γ〉 ← ∆] + P [A guesses ∆ˆ | |Γ′〉 ← ∆ˆ]
− |P [A is correct | |Γ〉 ← ∆ or ∆ˆ]− P [A is correct | |Γ〉 = |Γ′〉]|
≥ 1
2
+ Adv − 
for a negligible function . Indeed, this procedure works with non-negligible advantage
Adv − , as required.
Finally we are able to prove the security of the constructed protocol Π′.
Proof (Theorem 4.1). Suppose we are faced with an instance of the security game for Π;
that is, given the messages sent by the initiator PI in session Ψ with responder PR in
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session Ψ′ are m∗I and m
∗
R, respectively, we wish to determine whether a given string κb
is the true session key for session Ψ if b = 0, or a random string if b = 1. Suppose to
the contrary that there is an adversary A who wins the security game against Π′ with
non-negligible advantage Adv. We will use A as a distinguisher for our instance of the
security game against Π.
Before starting an instance of A, select two indices i∗, j∗ which are less than the
(polynomially-bounded) number of parties p that A will require. Further, choose a number
s∗ less than the (polynomially-bounded) number of pairs of session ψ that A will use. Run
A essentially as usual, but with the following modifications.
Set the private key/public key information for Pi∗ and Pj∗ to that of PI and PR,
respectively. If A initiates fewer than s∗ sessions, if its s∗th session is not initiated by Pi∗
with responder Pj∗ , or if its s∗th session is not the test session, abort and select new i∗, j∗
and s∗.
Given that A initiates the s∗th with initiator Pi∗ and responder Pj∗ , set the session
identifier as Ψ and the peer session identifier as Ψ′. Set the initiator’s outgoing message
as (m∗I , σ
∗
I = SignskI (idI , idR; Ψ;m
∗
I ; rΨ)) and the responder’s message as (m
∗
R, σ
∗
R), where
σ∗R = SignskR(idI , idR; Ψ,Ψ
′;m∗R; rΨ′). If this is not eventually the test session, abort and
choose i∗, j∗ and s∗ again; in particular, if A ever issues a command that would make either
session no longer clean, abort.
By Lemma 4.5, we know that the adversary cannot construct a state for which the
amplitude of a valid responding message is non-negligible; hence by Lemma 4.3 we know
that A must pass some registers to the responding party Pj∗ , since otherwise the proba-
bility amplitude of states for which the session key obtained from the registers sent to the
initiating party will be valid for Ψ is negligible, and there will be no matching session Ψ′ to
test. Moreover, the adversary must either deliver some response registers to the initiating
party or the test session must be Ψ′, since otherwise the adversary cannot win the game
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with non-negligible advantage. In either case, the global state before the test session is
|Γ〉 =
∑
~µ
α~µ,m∗I ,σ∗I ,m∗R,σ∗R |m∗I , σ∗I 〉 |m∗R, σ∗R〉
+
∑
~µ
VerifypkI
(mI ,σI)=0
or VerifypkR (mR,σR)=0
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉
+
∑
~µ
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈F
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉
where the second register is the one delivered to Pj∗ and the third is the one obtained
from Pj∗ in session Ψ′, possibly after applying some unitary operator, and, except with
negligible probability,
Φ =
∑
~µ
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈F
|α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |
is negligible, again by Lemma 4.5.
When the Test query is issued, if the test session is Ψ apply the map:
|mR, σR〉 |y〉 7→

|mR, σR〉 |y ⊕ κb〉 if mR = m∗R and σR = σ∗R
|mR, σR〉 |y⊕ ⊥〉 if VerifyskR(mR, σR) = 0
|mR, σR〉 |y ⊕ ρ(mR)〉 otherwise
to the register received by Pi∗ in session Ψ and the target register provided by A, where ρ
maps pairs of messages to random strings. If instead the test session is Ψ′, apply the map
|mI , σI〉 |y〉 7→

|mI , σI〉 |y ⊕ κb〉 if mI = m∗I and σI = σ∗I
|mI , σI〉 |y ⊕ ⊥〉 if VerifyskI (mI , σI) = 0
|mI , σI〉 |y ⊕ ρ(mI)〉 otherwise
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In either case, the global state after the test query is
|Γ〉 =
∑
~µ,y
α~µ,m∗I ,σ∗I ,m∗R,σ∗R |m∗I , σ∗I 〉 |m∗R, σ∗R〉 |y ⊕ κb〉
+
∑
~µ,y
VerifypkI
(mI ,σI)=0
or VerifypkR (mR,σR)=0
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉 |y ⊕ ⊥〉
+
∑
~µ,y
(mI ,σI ,mR,σR)∈F
α~µ,mI ,σI ,mR,σR |mI , σI〉 |mR, σR〉 |y ⊕ ρ′(mI ,mR)〉 .
Notice that this is simply |Γ′b〉 from Corollary 4.8, and so A will guess b correctly (in
the context of its security game) with advantage Adv −  for some negligible function .
Then, by Corollary 4.9, this correct guess will be the correct guess for our security game
with advantage Adv −  − ′ where ′ is negligible; in particular, our advantage is non-
negligible provided that we have chosen the correct i∗, j∗, and s∗. Since we choose these
correctly with probability at least 1
p2ψ
, a polynomial fraction, we see that our probability
of winning the game using A as a subroutine is at least 1
2
+ Adv−−
′
p2ψ
which is non-negligibly
greater than a half; that is, protocol Π is insecure. This is a contradiction, and so no such
adversary A must exist; that is, the protocol Π′ is secure.
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Chapter 5
A Secure Protocol from
Supersingular Elliptic Curve
Isogenies
In this chapter we apply the generic construction from Section 4.5 to construct a secure
authenticated key establishment protocol whose underlying computational problem is the
Supersingular Isogeny Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (SSDDH). The underling key es-
tablishment protocol is De Feo, Jao, and Pluˆt’s scheme [9], with authentication provided
by a signature scheme constructed by applying Eaton and Song’s [11] and Boneh and
Zhandry’s [5] transformations to Sun et. al’s [35] strong designated verifier signature
scheme, similar to the method applied in Soukharev, Jao, and Seshadri’s work [34].
To begin we define the required global parameters. For authentication we require
1. pA = `
eS
S `
eV
V fA ± 1, a prime, where `S and `V are prime, and fA is a small cofactor
used so that pA is prime;
2. EA, a supersingular elliptic curve defined over KA = GF (p2A);
3. {PS, QS} and {PV , QV }, bases for EA[`eSS ] and EA[`eVV ], respectively;
4. H = (KeyGen(Hc), Hc, Invert, Sample), a quantum-safe chameleon hash function; and,
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5. O1,O2,O3, random oracles.
For key establishment we require
1. pK = `
eI
I `
eR
R fK ± 1, a prime, where `I and `R are prime, and fK is a small cofactor
used so that pK is prime;
2. EK , a supersingular elliptic curve defined over KK = GF (p2K); and,
3. {PI , QI} and {PR, QR}, bases for EK [`eII ] and EK [`eRR ], respectively.
Each party Pk must establish authentication keys; associated to each will be a private
key and public key for signing and a private key and public key for verification. In partic-
ular, Pk selects m(k)S , n(k)S ∈ Z/`eSS Z not both divisible by `S uniformly at random, and sets
E
(k)
S = EA/
〈
m
(k)
S PS + n
(k)
S QS
〉
. Further define φ
(k)
S to be the isogeny with domain EA and
image E
(k)
S . Similarly Pk selects m(k)V , n(k)V ∈ Z/`eVV Z not both divisible by `V uniformly
at random, sets E
(k)
V = EA/
〈
m
(k)
V PV + n
(k)
V QV
〉
, and further sets φ
(k)
V to be the isogeny
with domain EA and image E
(k)
V . The party must also select a private key/public key pair
(sk
(k)
H , pk
(k)
H ) for the chameleon hash function. Then Pk’s authentication key pair is
(sk(k), pk(k)) =
(
(sk
(k)
S , sk
(k)
V , sk
(k)
H ), (pk
(k)
S , pk
(k)
V , pk
(k)
H )
)
=
((
(m
(k)
S , n
(k)
S ), (m
(k)
V , n
(k)
V ), sk
(k)
H
)
,(
(E
(k)
S , φ
(k)
S (PV ), φ
(k)
S (QV )), (E
(k)
V , φ
(k)
V (PS), φ
(k)
V (QS)), pk
(k)
H
))
.
Then associated to each ordered pair (Pk,P`) of parties is a curve E(k,`)SV defined by
E
(k,`)
SV = E
(`)
V /
〈
m
(k)
S φ
(`)
V (PS) + n
(k)
S φ
(`)
V (QS)
〉
= E
(k)
S /
〈
m
(`)
V φ
(k)
S (PV ) + n
(`)
V φ
(k)
S (QV )
〉
which both Pk and P` can compute using their secret keys and the other’s public keys.
This curve will be used for Pk to sign a message to P`.
The protocol is as follows (here Pk is the initiator and P` is the responder).
1. Upon being instructed to start a session with P`, Pk:
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a) Selects a session identifier Ψ;
b) Selects x
(Ψ)
I , y
(Ψ)
I ∈ Z/`eII Z, not both divisible by `I , uniformly at random;
c) Constructs R(Ψ) = x
(Ψ)
I PI + y
(Ψ)
I QI , defines φ
(Ψ) to be the isogeny with kernel〈
R(Ψ)
〉
, and sets
m(Ψ) = (E(Ψ) = EK/
〈
R(Ψ)
〉
, φ(Ψ)(PR), φ
(Ψ)(QR), idk, id`,Ψ);
d) Selects r(Ψ) ∈ {0, 1}∗ at random;
e) Sets
σ(Ψ) = (σ1, σ2, σ3)
= (Sample(λ),O1(r(Ψ)||j(E(k,`)SV )), Invertsk(k)H (r
(Ψ),O2(O3(m(Ψ), σ1)||σ2))),
and;
f) Activates Send(id`,m
(Ψ), σ(Ψ))
2. Upon receiving (m,σ), P`:
a) Computes
b(Ψ
′) =
{
1 if σ2 = O1(Hpk(k)H (O2(O3(m,σ1)||σ2), σ3)||j(E
(k,`)
SV ))
0 otherwise
;
If b(Ψ
′) = 0 the delivered message is invalid and is hence rejected; then P`
activates Send(idk;⊥,⊥,⊥). Otherwise, P`:
b) Selects a session identifier Ψ′;
c) Selects x
(Ψ′)
R , y
(Ψ′)
R ∈ Z/`eRR Z, not both divisible by `R, uniformly at random;
d) Constructs R(Ψ
′) = x
(Ψ′)
R PR+y
(Ψ′)
R QR, defines φ
(Ψ′) to be the isogeny with kernel〈
R(Ψ
′)
〉
, and sets
m(Ψ
′) = (E(Ψ
′) = EK/
〈
R(Ψ
′)
〉
, φ(Ψ
′)(PI), φ
(Ψ′)(QI), idk, id`,Ψ,Ψ
′);
e) Selects r(Ψ
′) ∈ {0, 1}∗ at random;
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f) Sets
σ(Ψ
′) = (σ1, σ2, σ3)
= (Sample(λ),O1(r(Ψ′)||j(E(`,k)SV )), Invertsk(`)H (r
(Ψ′),O2(O3(m(Ψ′), σ1)||σ2))),
and;
g) Activates Send(id`,m
(Ψ′), σ(Ψ
′))
After receiving the message, if P` needs to compute the session key, it computes
K(Ψ
′) =
{ ⊥ if b(Ψ′) = 0
m1/
〈
x
(Ψ′)
R m2 + y
(Ψ′)
R m3
〉
otherwise
.
3. Upon receiving (m,σ), Pk computes
b(Ψ) =
{
1 if σ2 = O1(Hpk(`)H (O2(O3(m,σ1)||σ2), σ3)||j(E
(`,k)
SV ))
0 otherwise
;
After receiving the message, if Pk needs to compute the session key, it computes
K(Ψ) =
{ ⊥ if b(Ψ) = 0
m1/
〈
x
(Ψ)
I m2 + y
(Ψ)
I m3
〉
otherwise
.
Theorem 5.1 (Correctness of the Scheme). The scheme described above is correct.
Proof. Suppose that all messages are relayed faithfully. It is clear that b(Ψ
′) = 1 and
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b(Ψ) = 1 in this case, and so
K(Ψ) = j
(
E(Ψ
′)/
〈
x
(Ψ)
I φ
(Ψ′)(PI) + y
(Ψ)
I φ
(Ψ′)(QI)
〉)
= j
((
EK/
〈
x
(Ψ′)
R PR + y
(Ψ′)
R QR
〉)
/
〈
φ(Ψ
′)
(
x
(Ψ)
I PI + y
(Ψ)
I QI
)〉)
= j
(
EK/
〈
x
(Ψ′)
R PR + y
(Ψ′)
R QR, x
(Ψ)
I PI + y
(Ψ)
I QI
〉)
= j
((
EK/
〈
x
(Ψ)
I PI + y
(Ψ′)
I QI
〉)
/
〈
φΨ
(
x
(Ψ′)
R PR + y
(Ψ′)
R QR
)〉)
= j
(
EΨ/
〈
x
(Ψ′)
R φΨ(PR) + y
(Ψ′)
R φΨ(QR)
〉)
= K(Ψ
′);
that is, the session keys are equal, as required.
Theorem 5.2 (Security of the Scheme). Under the Supersingular Isogeny Decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption, the scheme described above is secure in the security model described
in Chapter 4 in the quantum random oracle model.
Proof. By Theorem 4.1 it suffices to show that the underlying signature scheme is EUF-
qCMA, and that the underlying key establishment protocol is secure if the adversary is
restricted to delivering messages faithfully.
The signature scheme is constructed by applying the constructions from Theorem 2.3
and Corollary 2.5 to Sun et al.’s SDV signature scheme, which is EUF-CMA against an
adversary who can perform polynomially-bounded quantum computations in the random
oracle model by Theorem 2.2. Thus the signature scheme in use is EUF-qCMA with
quantumly-accessible random oracles, as required.
The underlying key establishment protocol is simply the protocol from [9, Section 3.1],
with some additional information included in each message. We show that this is secure
when all messages are relayed faithfully. Suppose there is an adversary A who breaks the
security of the protocol with advantage  while relaying all messages faithfully. Suppose
we are faced with an instance
(E,EA, EB, φA(PB), φA(QB), φB(PA), φB(QA), EC)
of the Supersingular Isogeny Decision Diffie-Hellman problem. To solve the problem,
choose an integer i∗ between 1 and ψ, a polynomial upper bound on the number of ses-
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sion pairs that A will require. Run A as usual, except that if the i∗th session pair is
reached, set the initiator’s message as EA, φA(PB), φA(QB)) and the responder’s message
as (EB, φB(PA), φB(QA)). If A requests a session key reveal on either session in this session
pair, if this session pair is not reached, or if neither session in the pair is the test session,
abort. Otherwise, one of the sessions is the test session, and in that session A must deliver
the appropriate message to the appropriate party. When the Test query is issued, write
EC to the appropriate target registers. If EC = EAB, then it is the proper session key for
the session, while if EC 6= EAB, it is simply a random element of the keyspace. Thus by
guessing that EC = EAB if and only if A guesses that the key is the true session key, we
solve the Supersingular Isogeny Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem with advantage . The
probability that we select the correct session pair is at least 1
ψ
, and so our overall advan-
tage is 
ψ
; thus under the Supersingular Isogeny Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption 
ψ
is
negligible, and hence  is negligible; that is, the scheme is secure against an adversary who
is restricted to delivering messages faithfully.
Hence the protocol is indeed secure, as required.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a security model for authenticated key establishment in which the
adversary can deliver quantum superpositions of messages to parties who would ordinarily
be participating in a classical protocol, analogous to allowing quantum signing queries in
EUF-qCMA security of signature schemes or quantum encryption/decryption queries in
standard post-quantum security definitions of encryption [5, 12]. We demonstrate that the
corresponding new security definition is achievable by constructing a specific example of
a secure key establishment protocol assuming the quantum hardness of a Diffie-Hellman-
type problem for isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves, and give a generic construction
for secure protocols using sufficiently secure signature schemes and unauthenticated key
establishment protocols.
Although I would argue that the security model and definition presented in Chapter 4 is
a natural one for post-quantum authenticated key establishment, before it is to be adopted
it remains to establish a separation between this security definition and, for instance,
the more standard Canetti-Krawczyk model with a quantum adversary—that is, we must
show that there are protocols which are secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model when the
adversary has access to a quantum computer which are insecure when the adversary can
deliver quantum superpositions of messages. We would like to establish this separation to
demonstrate the necessity of our post-quantum security model and to convince people of
its utility. Once this separation is established, we can work toward answering the following
questions:
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• Are current “post-quantum” authenticated key establishment protocols secure in this
model?
• Are their other simple generic constructions for secure protocols? Does the encrypt-
and-MAC paradigm from [1, Section 3.2] carry over the same way the signature-based
method [1, Section 3.1] does?
• Are the protocols that arise from these generic constructions efficient? If not, how
can we do better?
• How can we modify the model to include more sophisticated security properties such
as key compromise impersonation resilience and resilience against malicious insiders
[23]?
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